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UNION REPRESENTATIVES AS 
CORPORATE DIRECTORS: THE 
CHALLENGE TO THE 
ADVERSARIAL MODEL OF LABOR 
RELATIONS 
Robert A. McCormick* 
Maybe the adversary relationship is 
precisely what is wrong with the Ameri-
can labor movement. 
-Douglas Fraser1 
I'm afraid it's a sellout. 
-Maye L. Amos,1 
Chrysler employee 
In 1979, during the collective bargaining negotiations between 
the United Auto Workers Union ("UAW") and the Chrysler 
Corporation, the parties agreed upon a union proposal of a revo-
lutionary nature in American labor-management relations. 
Chrysler Chairman Lee A. Iacocca would recommend that Doug-
las Fraser, President of the UAW, be elected to the board of 
directors of the corporation; in return, the union granted wage 
and benefit concessions, and agreed to work for the company's 
loan guarantee plan. 8 In May 1980, Chrysler shareholders ac-
cepted the recommendation of the nominating committee, and 
Fraser, in his words, "became the first trade unionist to serve on 
the board of a major private corporation in this country."" 
1 Associate Professor of Law, Detroit College of Law. B.A., 1969, Michigan State Uni-
versity; J.D., 1973, University of Michigan. I would like to thank Joseph Canfield, Class 
of 1982, Detroit College of Law, for his abundant assistance throughout the development 
of this Article. My thanks go also to Rudolph Wartella and Richard Goodman, Detroit 
College of Law, for their research assistance and to my secretary, Mary Ann Hill, for her 
preparation of the manuscript. 
1. Blue Collars in the Board Room, TIME, May 19, 1980, at 78, 78. 
2. Id. 
3. See The Risk in Putting a Union Chief an the Board, Bus. WK., May 19, 1980, at 
149; The $203 Millian Seat an the Board, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 5, 1979, at 82; Chrysler's 
Blue-Callar Director, TIME, Nov. 5, 1979, at 84; N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1979, at 1, col. 4; 
Wall St. J., Oct. 29, 1979, at 6, col. 2; Wall St. J., Oct. 26, 1979, at 3, col. 1. 
4. Fraser, Labor's Voice an the Board, NEWSWEEK, May 26, 1980, at 13, 13. Subse-
quent to Fraser's election to the Chrysler Board, in the fall of 1980, the management of 
the American Motors Corporation ("AMC") agreed conditionally with the UAW to seat a 
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Whether this event constitutes a temporary aberration in in-
dustrial relations, born of the particular circumstances of the 
employer and the innovative leadership of the union, or whether 
it represents a trend toward the European experience of em-
ployee representation in management affairs,11 is the subject of 
some debate and conjecture.6 Nevertheless, it is difficult to over-
state the magnitude of this departure from the role played by 
unions during the past century in their relations with manage-
ment. Orgai:iized labor and management have long viewed each 
other as adversaries. At the same time, unions have traditionally 
considered their interests to be served best by a limited role and 
have thus spurned broader managerial activities within enter-
prises employing their members. The acceptance of a role in cor-
porate governance by a union official represents a major depar-
ture from labor's traditional approach and constitutes an 
experiment with nonadversarial employment relations at the 
policy-making level of the enterprise.7 In this venture, the UAW 
and Chrysler have ushered in an entirely new vision of American 
union representative on the company's governing board, see Wall St. J., Sept. 17, 1980, 
at 4, col. 1, with the major condition being that approval of the undertaking be obtained 
from the Department of Justice and the Labor Department, see Wall St. J., Mar. 2, 1981, 
at 3, col. 3. The Justice Department, however, was "unable to state a present intention to 
institute or not to institute antitrust enforcement proceedings challenging contempora-
neous service by members of the UAW on the boards of AMC and Chrysler." Interlock-
ing Directorates-Union Representation, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 11 50,425, at 55,968 
(Feb. 26, 1981). The Labor Department, on the other hand, did approve the arrange-
ment. See Labor Department on UAW AMC Board Seat, 2 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 
106, at 147 (Feb. 23, 1981) (finding that the UAW-AMC agreement would not violate the 
Taft-Hartley or Landrum-Griffin Acts). 
A few initiatives similar to these recent developments in the automobile industry have 
occurred in other settings as well. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1982, at 32, col. 4 (midw. ed.) 
(Pan American World Airways nominated an employee who was also a union official to 
its board of directors); cf. Wall St. J., Apr. 28, 1972, at 34, col. 1 (employees of United 
Air Lines defeated in an attempt at stockholders' meeting to gain representation on the 
company's board). 
5. See generally A. STURMTHAL, COMPARATIVE LABOR MOVEMENTS (1972); Davies, Em-
ployee Representation on Company Boards and Participation in Corporate Planning, 
38 Mon. L. REV. 254 (1975); Vagts, Reforming the "Modern" Corporation: Perspectives 
from the German, 80 HARV. L. REV. 23 (1966); Note, Employee Codetermination: Ori-
gins in Germany, Present Practice in Europe, and Applicability to the United States, 
14 HARV. J. LEGJS. 947, 949-87 (1977). 
6. See Senser, Industrial Democracy, Ltd., 107 COMMONWEAL 489 (1980); Note, Serv-
ing Two Masters: Union Representation on Corporate Boards of Directors, 81 CoLUM. 
L. REV. 639, 640 (1981) ("Should this first example of employee representation in a ma-
jor corporation prove successful, it is likely that the practice will become increasingly 
common."); More Unions Knocking at Boardroom Doors?, INDus. WK., Nov. 12, 1979, at 
19. 
7. At the same time, the UAW and the automobile manufacturers are at the forefront 
of innovations aimed at increasing worker involvement in production decisions. See The 
New Industrial Relations, Bus. WK., May 11, 1981, at 84; infra note 114. 
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labor-management relations, the legal ramifications of which re-
main largely unexplored.8 The question must be asked, there-
fore, whether and to what degree the National Labor Relations 
Act ("NLRA")9 will accommodate deviations from the conven-
tional model of labor-management relations. 
Moreover, further questions arise concerning whether this de-
parture from a limited, adversarial union role will be beneficial 
for labor. A substantial majority of union officials remain skepti-
cal about this new arrangement;10 some reject the approach out-
right11 while others are more ambivalent,111 but all must certainly 
8. Some recent commentary, however, has explored certain aspects of the question. 
See Note, supra note 6; Comment, Broadening the Board: Labor Participation in Cor-
porate Governance, 34 SW. L.J. 963 (1980); Note, Employee Representative on the Cor-
porate Board of Directors: Implications Under Labor, Antitrust, and Corporate Law, 27 
WAYNE L. REV. 367 (1980). 
9. Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-166 (West 1973 
& Supp. 1974-1980)). For treatment of the background and development of the NLRA 
and its amendments, see generally J. BELLACE & A. BERKOWITZ, THE LANDRUM-GRIFFIN 
ACT (1979); H. MiLLIS & E. BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO TAFT-HARTLEY (1950); 
The Developing Labor Law (C. Morris ed. 1971); Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act, 1947 (pts. 1 & 2), 61 HARV. L. REV. 1, 274 (1947-1948). 
10. Following his election to the Chrysler board, Fraser said: "This development nat-
urally has stirred a vigorous debate in management and labor circles. Some view it as a 
breakthrough, others as an abomination." Fraser, supra note 4, at 13. This is not the first 
time, however, that the UAW and the automobile manufacturers have negotiated ar-
rangements perceived as revolutionary at the time but now considered standard practice. 
For example, in 1948 the union and the manufacturers negotiated the first cost-of-living 
escalator provisions, and in 1955 the UA W's supplemental unemployment benefit pro-
gram was first agreed upon as part of a collective bargaining contract. Today, such pro-
grams are commonplace. See id. 
11. See, e.g., Letter from Ted Reed, Dir. of Research, Int'! Union of Operating 
Eng'rs, to author (Mar. 19, 1981) (union opposes concept of labor representatives on 
corporate governing boards); Letter from Robert L. Wartinger, Vice Pres., Int'! Typo-
graphical Union, to author (Mar. 13, 1981) (rejecting notion of placing union officials on 
corporate boards, because to do so would create an undesirable "one with management" 
impression); Letter from Walter L. Davis, Dir. of Info., United Food & Commercial 
Workers Int'! Union, to author (Mar. 5, 1981) (stating that Union President William H. 
Wynn has publicly opposed participation on corporate boards); Letter from Victor W. 
Fuentealba, Pres., Am. Fed. of Musicians, to author (Feb. 19, 1981) ("there is a definite 
conflict of interest when a union representative serves on the governing board of an em-
ployer"); Letter from Reginald Newell, Dir. of Research, Int'! Ass'n of Machinists & 
Aerospace Workers, to author (Feb. 9, 1981) ("If anything, the attacks on organized la-
bor in recent years by Corporate America and the the New Right have reinforced our 
negative views .... ") (all letters on file with the Journal of Law Reform). 
12. See, e.g., Letter from Wilbur Daniels, Vice Pres., Int'! Ladies Garment Workers 
Union, to author (Feb. 18, 1981) (no position taken on the question of union representa-
tives serving as corporate directors); Letter from William Casamo, Exec. Ass't to the 
Pres., United Paperworkers Int'! Union, to author (Feb. 11, 1981) (noting that the sub-
ject has never been "seriously addressed or entertained," and concluding that "there is 
no genuine interest or concern''. with the question); Letter from Charles R. Armstrong, 
Gen. Counsel, United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers of Am., to author (Feb. 
6, 1981) (no firm union position, either pro or con, on question of union representation) 
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recognize the possible ramifications of the Chrysler-UAW exper-
iment for the future of labor policy in this country.13 
This Article addresses these questions first by discussing the 
predominant philosophical approach adopted by unions in their 
dealings with management, and then describing several ways in 
which the labor laws reflect this traditional model of employ-
ment relations by showing, first, that the influence of unions has 
been limited to circumscribed categories of business decisions. 
The Article next examines decisions made by the National La-
bor Relations Board ("NLRB") and the courts that have care-
fully sought to separate employer from employee, assuming their 
interests to be inherently antagonistic. Then follows an evalua-
tion of the NLRB's treatment of deviations from the traditional 
model of labor-management relations, with special emphasis 
given those circumstances under which union officials will be 
permitted to assume an active, participatory function in the en-
tire spectrum of business decisions. Finally, the Article con-
cludes by considering the implications, particularly for the indi-
vidual member-employee, of a broader role for labor in 
corporate governance. 
I. THE ADVERSARIAL TRADITION IN LABOR-MANAGEMENT 
RELATIONS 
At the outset, it is clear that the involvement of employee rep-
resentatives in the whole range of management decisions repre-
sents a fundamental departure from the theory and practice of 
trade unionism as followed, in the main, during the past century 
in this country. Despite periodic departures from the predomi-
nant approach, the prevailing spirit of the American trade-union 
movement has been that of "business unionism"; unions have 
primarily, though not exclusively, endeavored to improve wages, 
hours, and working conditions for their members, and have been 
(all letters on file with the Journal of Law Reform). 
13. See The $203 Million Seat on the Board, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 5, 1979, at 82 (Lane 
Kirkland, then Secretary-Treasurer and now President of the AFL-CIO, stated he would 
"wait to see how the whole thing works out"); Letter from Anne C. Green, Dir. of Re-
search and Educ., Int'l Chemical Workers Union, to author (Feb. 18, 1981) ("Certainly 
the idea is exciting and a great deal of discussion has taken place both within the Execu-
tive Board and [among] members of this union.") (on file with the Journal of Law Re-
form). But cf. N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1981, at Al, col. 4 (while not rejecting the possibility 
for union representation on corporate boards, AFL-CIO President Kirkland argued that 
control over pension funds and other corporate assets has far greater potential as a 
source of union strength). 
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only secondarily concerned with broader issues of social and cor-
porate policy. 14 This orientation emerged as the central force be-
hind the Federation of Organized Trades and Labor Unions 
formed a century ago111 and reorganized in 1886 as the American 
Federation of Labor.18 The theory rejected utopian and radical 
approaches to relations between workers and owners and 
adopted a "philosophy of pure wage consciousness,"17 which 
viewed the interests of management and labor to be inherently 
.J 
in conflict. The purpose of unions was to maximize wages and 
better the terms and conditions of employment for their mem-
bers, because the goal of managers, on the other hand, was to 
minimize labor costs and to secure a competent work force at 
the lowest wage the market permitted. 
Unions considered their interests to be served best by a lim-
ited focus, and, as a result, repudiated more expansive manage-
rial roles within corporate enterprises. Samuel Gompers, the 
Federation's first leader and influential early thinker, accepted, 
if not embraced, capitalism and sought to enlarge the bargaining 
power of the industrial worker.18 Gompers believed that capital 
and labor were natural adversaries in a struggle to reap the prof-
its of industry. He did not believe workers and management 
shared common interests; rather, each sought distinct and differ-
ent ends.19 In his view, therefore, labor's role was solely to nego-
14. See A. REES, THE ECONOMICS OF TRADE UNIONS 2 (1962). Regarding the theory 
and practice of trade unionism in the United States, see generally I. BERNSTEIN, THE 
LEAN YEARS (1960); A. BLUM, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT (1972); H. 
PELLING, AMERICAN LABOR (1960); M. PERLMAN, LABOR UNION THEORIES IN AMERICA 
(1958); S. PERLMAN, A THEORY OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT (1928). 
The program of the Industrial Workers of the World ("I.W.W."), which began in 1905, 
probably represented the most radical departure from the traditional trade union ap-
proach. Its aim was the immediate abolition of the wage system and the elimination of 
capitalism. Like ~ther challenges to conventional trade unionism, it faltered. 
The overwhelming bulk of American workingmen remained as fundamentally 
opposed to the I.W.W. philosophy as were their employers or the middle class 
generally. The American Federation of Labor, which lost no opportunity to dis-
credit and attack its radical rival, continued to dominate the labor movement 
and revolutionary unionism made no real headway against business unionism. 
F. DULLES, LABOR IN AMERICA 222-23 (3d ed. 1966). 
15. See F. DULLES, supra note 14, at 157-61. 
16. See B. MELTZER, LABOR LAW 6 (2d ed. 1977). 
17. See S. PERLMAN, supra note 14, at 197-207. 
18. See generally S. GOMPERS, SEVENTY YEARS OF LIFE AND LABOR (1925); M. HILL-
QUIT, S. GOMPERS & M.J. HAYES, THE DoUBLE EDGE OF LABOR'S SwoRD (1914 & photo. 
reprint 1971); S. KAUFMAN, SAMUEL GOMPERS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN FEDERA-
TION OF LABOR, 1848-1896 (1973); L. REED, THE LABOR PHILOSOPHY OF SAMUEL GOMPERS 
(1930 & photo. reprint 1966). 
19. Gompers observed that "[t]here has never yet existed identity of interests be-
tween buyer and seller of an article. If you have anything to sell and I want to buy it 
your interest and mine are not identical." 7 U.S. INDUSTRIAL CoMM'N, REP<>RT, testimony 
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tiate on behalf of workers. 
By and large, the pragmatic posture espoused by Gompers 
still inheres in the approach of most unions toward their rela-
tions with management. Indeed, while most unions have not 
adopted an official position on the propriety of union officers' 
taking positions in corporate governance,20 many question the 
wisdom of the broader role secured by Fraser. This new venture 
is seen by numerous union officials as impractical,21 illogical,22 or 
not feasible,23 while others see the arrangement as useful only 
when the employer is in severe financial difficulty.24 Among the 
concerns articulated is the fear that by obtaining positions on 
governing boards, unions will become "one with management"H 
- with the result that unions' ability to improve working condi-
tions and redress grievances for employees will be diminished.18 
at 655 (1901) (statement of Samuel Gompers); see also M. PERLMAN, supra note 14, at 
271 (Gompers felt "that those who thought that labor management would come to recog-
nize one another's rights and share identical interests were talking of something 'very 
remote and very far removed'") (quoting id.). The Preamble to the American Federation 
of Labor's first constitution embodied Gompers' view of this inherent conflict: "Whereas 
... a struggle is going on in all the civilized world between the Capitalists and the La-
borers which grows in intensity from year to year .... " P. JACOBS, OLD BEFORE ITS 
TIME: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 28 (1963). 
20. See supra note 12; see also, e.g., Letter from AnJ!e C. Green, supra note 13; Let-
ter from Vera Miller, Vice Pres., Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union, to 
author (Feb. 11, 1981) (on file with the Journal of Law Reform); Letter from William 0. 
Kuhl, Dir. of Research & Educ., Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, Black-
smiths, Forgers and Helpers, to author (Feb. 11, 1981) (on file with the Journal of Law 
Reform); Letter from June McMahon, Service Employees Int'l Union, to author (Feb. 6, 
1981) (on file with the Journal of Law Reform); Telephone interview with Arthur F. 
Kane, Dir. of Research & Educ., Int'! Bhd. Teamsters, Chauffers, Warehousemen & 
Helpers of Am. (Feb. 5, 1981). But see supra note 11. 
21. See, e.g., Letter from Robert L. Wartinger, Vice Pres., lnt'l Typographical Union, 
to author (Mar. 13, 1981); Letter from L. Gerald Carlisle, Treasurer, Int'! Union of 
Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen, to author (Feb. 20, 1981); Letter from William J. 
Donlon, Gen. Counsel, Bhd. Ry., Airline & Steamship Clerks, to author (Feb. 20, 1981) 
(all letters on file with the Journal of Law Reform). 
22. See, e.g., UNITED ELEC., RADIO & MACHINE WORKERS OF AM., 1980 GENERAL OF-
FICERS REP. 16-18 [hereinafter cited as 1980 UE REP.) (on file with the Journal of Law 
Reform); Letter from Walter L. Davis, supra note 11. 
23. See, e.g., Letter from Walter L. Davis, supra note 11; Letter from L. Gerald Car-
lisle, supra note 21; Letter from William A. McGowan, Gen. Counsel, United Bhd. of 
Carpenters & Joiners of Am., to author (Feb. 10, 1981) (on file with the Journal of Law 
Reform). 
24. See letter from Walter L. Davis, supra note 11. Thus, for example, members of 
the United Food & Commercial Workers International Union who were employees of the 
Rath Packing Company - which had suffered through five consecutive years of losses -
purchased 60% of the company's stock and thereafter appointed 10 of the 16 members 
of the corporate board. Woodworth, Workers Take Over, N.Y. Times, June 25, 1980, at 
A27, col. 1. 
25. See Letter from Robert L. Wartinger, supra note 21. 
26. See id; see also Address by William W. Winpisinger, Gen. Vice Pres., Int'l Ass'n 
WINTER 1982] Union Directors on Corporate Boards 225 
Although some union officials appear receptive to arrangements 
that would allow labor to divide the number of seats on corpo-
rate boards equally with management, they view a single union 
voice as "token" representation with "diluted" effect.111 The very 
strong perception continues that relations between labor and 
management are intrinsically antagonistic, so that collaborative 
efforts will not ultimately benefit employees;118 as well, there re-
mains a general preference for a limited approach to labor-man-
agement relations that eschews roles traditionally assigned to 
management.29 The comments of one labor official embody this 
prevailing union sentiment: 
Despite all the institutional advertising that industry 
does about its social responsibilities, the purpose of busi-
ness is to make a profit. If profits can be increased by 
holding down wages, speeding up production or replacing 
workers with machines, this is the way it will be done. 
of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, at the University of Michigan-Dearborn (Dec. 2, 
1976) ("workers can receive a better share of the fruits of free enterprise at bargaining 
tables than in board rooms") (Mr. Winpisinger is now president of the Association) (on 
file with the Journal of Law Reform). 
27. See, e.g., Letter from William J. Donlon, supra note 21; Letter from Roy A. Ock-
ert, Coordinator, Dep't of Research, Educ. & Collective Bargaining Coordination, Int'! 
Woodworkers of Am., to author (Feb. 20, 1981) (on file with the Journal of Law Reform); 
Letter from Reginald Newell, Dir. of Research, lnt'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace 
Workers, to author (Feb. 9, 1981) (on file with the Journal of Law Reform). 
28. See, e.g., 1980 UE REP., supra note 22, at 16 ("There are irreconcilable differ-
ences between labor and management on the company level because profit is produced 
from the labor power of workers."); More Unions Knocking at Boardroom Do<J[s?, supra 
note 6, at 20 (Teamsters President Frank Fitzsimmons observed: "Labor and manage-
ment have always been in an adversary position, and I do not think putting a union 
official on the board of directors ... will change that position."); Telephone interview 
with Arthur F. Kane, supra note 20. 
29. See, e.g., Letter from William J. Donlon, supra note 21 ("Historically, ... our 
organization has preferred to have management personnel assume those responsibilities 
of management."); Letter from Francis X. Burkhardt, Dir. of Research, Int'l Bhd. of 
Painters and Allied Trades, to author (Feb. 10, 1981) ("With regard to the management 
of operating costs, sales, marketing, etc. an advisory position for union representatives is 
as far as I would urge our Local Union officers to push for .... ") (on file with the 
Journal of Law Reform). Chrysler Chairman Iacocca, however, espouses a different 
perspective: 
I have to co-operate with the union because I got the guy on my board. I'm 
forced into dialogue. How can I lose? You say, "Oh yeah, but ideologically, they 
got their nose in the tent, the union will find out your decision to close a plant." 
Well, hell, they're gonna find out one way or another. I don't look at it like a 
purist who says, "Oh my God, my management prerogatives are going up in 
smoke." I think the world is a-changin'. 
Some Sayings from Chairman Lee, Detroit Free Press, Sept. 14, 1980, at E9, col. 1; see 
also Simison, Chrysler Lauds Strong Performance of UAW's Fraser as Board Member, 
Wall St. J., Mar. 12, 1981, at 33, col. 4. 
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. As lorig as these are the hard, cold realities of the 
basic relationship between management and labor, the 
union's place is not at the director's table, making man-
agement decisions, but at the bargaining table, protecting 
and pressing the rights of the work force.80 
II. THE LIMITED ROLE OF UNIONS UNDER THE LAW 
The NLRA institutionalized the concept of the limited union 
role, assigning to labor and management respective areas of sov-
ereignty. The traditional union emphasis upon wages, hours, and 
working conditions81 is embodied in the distinction between 
mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining. 82 One effect of 
this dichotomy is that although a union may insist that the em-
ployer bargain with it regarding subjects deemed mandatory, the 
right is reserved to the employer to implement unilaterally deci-
sions concerning those subjects deemed permissive. 88 While the 
union might have the statutory right to bargain about the effects 
of a decision," its right to involvement in the initial delibera-
tions of an employer exists only in circumscribed areas. As Fra-
ser made clear when he took the directorship, this limited sphere 
of influence motivated the UAW leadership to seek a broader 
role in directing the Chrysler Corporation: "Workers need and 
deserve a voice in determining their own destiny. To be effec-
tive, that voice must be heard before decisions are made, rather 
than afterward. We need to play a role in the decision-making 
process ,_ instead of reacting once the corporation has set its 
30. Address by William W. Winpisinger, supra note 26, at 5-6 (emphasis in original). 
31. See S. GOMPERS, LABOR AND THE EMPLOYER 286 (1920) ("Among the matters that 
properly come within the scope of collective bargaining are wages, hours of labor, condi-
tions and relations of employment . . . . But there is no belief held in the trade unions 
that its members shall control the plant or usurp the rights of the owners."); J. GETMAN, 
LABOR RELATIONS 40 (1978) ("The unions have rarely sought to become involved in deci-
sions concerning production, except to the extent such decisions have direct impact on 
the continuation of existing jobs. Nor have they become involved in questions of man-
agement personnel. They have been content to leave such decisions to management."). 
32. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (b)(3), (d) (1976). See generally Cox, The Duty To 
Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1401 (1958); Fleming, The Obligation to Bar-
gain in Good Faith, 47 VA. L. REv. 988 (1961). 
33. See Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers Local No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 
404 U.S. 157 (1971). 
34. See, e,g,, Shamrock Dairy, Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 998 (1957), modified, 124 N.L.R.B. 
494 (1959), enforced, 280 F.2d 665 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Bickford Shoes, Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 
1346 (1954); T.A. TREDWAY & S.E. TAYLOR, 109 N.L.R.B. 1045 (1954); Brown Truck & 
Trailer Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 999 (1953). 
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course."n 
A. The Mandatory-Permissive Dichotomy 
In the absence of a duty to bargain with a union, an employer 
has always possessed complete discretion, except as otherwise 
limited by law, to order the terms and conditions of employment 
and to determine all other business matters that could affect 
employees.88 Because a great many decisions bear upon condi-
tions of employment, the degree to which employees' selection of 
a union curtails this freedom is a question that goes to the heart 
of labor policy which has long proven difficult to resolve. 87 
The NLRA originally contained no definition of collective bar-
gaining. 88 Thus, at one time, it could be argued forcefully that -
although the Act gave legal status to the representative selected 
by a majority of employees and directed the employer to "bar-
gain collectively" with that representative - the subjects to be 
negotiated were to be left solely to the parties.89 It has now long 
been recognized, though, that the NLRB has the authority to 
determine the scope of subjects about which bargaining may be 
compelled. •0 As early as 1940, the Board assumed this author-
ity ,41 and Congress soon endorsed the Board's approach to de-
limiting mandatory subjects of bargaining.41 Section 8(d) of the 
35. Fraser, supra note 4, at 13. 
36. See generally Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting 
the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1404 (1967); Comment, 
Employment at Will and the Law of Contracts, 23 BUFFALO L. REv. 211 (1973). 
37. See Cox & Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the National Labor 
Relations Board, 63 HARV. L. REv. 389, 401 (1950) ("There are few more troublesome 
problems in industrial relations than those of determining the respective responsibilities 
of management and union for decisons which are of practical concern to both the em-
ployer and the employee."). 
38. Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA makes it unlawful for an employer to "refuse to 
bargain collectively" with the employee representative, subject to § 9(a). 29 U.S.C. § 
158(a)(5) (1976). Section 9(a) establishes that the employee representative is the exclu-
sive representative for the purposes of collective bargaining regarding rates of pay, 
wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) 
(1976). 
39. See, e.g., 79 CONG. REC. 7659 (1935) ("The bill does not go beyond the office door. 
It leaves the discussion between the employer and the employee, and the agreements 
which they may or may not make, voluntary.") (remarks of Sen. Walsh). 
40. See Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 219 n.2 (1964) 
(Stewart, J., concurring); Cox & Dunlop, supra note 37, at 397. 
41. See Singer Mfg. Co., 24 N.L.R.B. 444 (1940), enforced, 119 F.2d 131 (7th Cir. 
1941); Wilson & Co., 19 N.L.R.B. 990, 999, enforced, 115 F.2d 759 (8th Cir. 1940). 
42. During consideration of the Taft-Hartley amendments, the House bill contained 
an actual list of mandatory subjects excluding all others. See H.R. 3020 § 2(11), 80th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), reprinted in 1 N.L.R.B., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY or THE LABOR 
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NLRA, as enacted in 1947, defined collective bargaining as 
"[t]he performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and 
the representative· of the employees to meet at reasonable times 
and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment."43 
Notwithstanding the open-endedness of the statute, however, 
"wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment" 
were undeniably words of limitation, for "Congress had no ex-
pectation that the elected union representative would become an 
equal partner in the running of the business enterprise in which 
union members are employed."44 Though the further elucidation 
of "wages" and "hours" has caused relatively little difficulty, the 
nature of "conditions of employment" has been hotly debated 
and vigorously litigated for many years.411 A wide variety of busi-
ness decisions greatly affect the job security and working condi-
tions of employees. Decisions regarding product choice and de-
sign, the substitution of labor-saving devices, plant relocation or 
closure, and subcontracting, although traditionally considered to 
be appropriately within the sole discretion of management, 
clearly have grave implications for employees. Indeed, often-
times the very existence of jobs may be at stake. Nevertheless, 
numerous interpretations of the Act'6 have excluded the influ-
ence of organized labor in these critical areas. 
For many years, the Board espoused the view that an em-
ployer had no duty under NLRA section 8(a)(5) to consult with 
the bargaining representative before deciding matters such as 
subcontracting and plant closure, so long as the decision was not 
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 31, 40 (1948). Congress rejected this approach in 
favor of continuing in the NLRB the power to further define mandatory subjects of bar-
gaining on a case-by-case basis. See First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 101 S. Ct. 
2573, 2579 n.14 (1981). 
43. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976). 
44. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 101 S. Ct. 2573, 2579 (1981). 
45. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488 (1979); Allied Chemical & Alkali 
Workers Local No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971); NLRB v. Woos-
ter Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958); American Smelting & Refining Co. v. 
NLRB, 406 F.2d 552 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 935 (1969); S. 3548, 86th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1960) (congressional attempt to limit "conditions of employment"); Cox, Labor 
Decisions of the Supreme Court at the October Term, 1957, 44 VA. L. REV. 1057, 1083-84 
(1958); Rabin, Fibreboard and the Termination of Bargaining Unit Work: The Search 
for Standards in Defining the Scope of the Duty to Bargain, 71 CoLUM. L. REV. 803 
(1971). 
46. E.g., First Nat'! Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 101 S. Ct. 2573 (1981); Royal Type-
writer Co. v. NLRB, 533 F.2d 1030 (8th Cir. 1976); NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 350 F.2d 
108 (8th Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1961); National 
Car Rental System, 252 N.L.R.B. 159 (1980); Summit Tooling Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 479 
(1972). 
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motivated by anti-union animus.47 Board rulings required only 
that the employer bargain with the union concerning the effects 
of such decisions, as distinct from the decisions themselves. ' 8 
Similarly, the Supreme Court early, and consistently thereafter, 
interpreted the law as embracing the customary, limited ap-
proach toward the union role,'9 and relied upon existing con-
tracts to determine the subjects that the parties themselves con-
sidered appropriate for collective bargaining. IHI Thus, the 
circumscribed sphere of influence traditionally embraced by or-
ganized labor became a significant element of the legal frame-
work governing labor-management relations. 
This approach, however, has not been followed uniformly by 
the Board, which in 1962 adopted a much more expansive view 
of the term "conditions of employment." In essence, the Board 
began to look at the effect of employer decisions upon the bar-
gaining unit in determining whether a mandatory bargaining 
subject was involved. As a result, the Board held that an em-
ployer violated its duty to bargain by unilaterally subcontract-
ing, for economic reasons only, work formerly performed by unit 
employees.111 
This constituted a major expansion of the role traditionally 
sought by and assigned to labor. If unions had the right, and 
employers the correlative duty, to bargain about .all decisions 
even tangentially affecting conditions of employment, there 
would be an enormously broad range of business decisions sub-
ject to mandatory bargaining. This approach by the Board, then, 
constituted a fundamental challenge to the limited model of in-
dustrial relations, and came before the Supreme Court in the 
controversial case of Fibreboard Paper Products v. NLRB. 111 
47. See Mahoning Mining Co., 61 N.L.R.B. 792, 803 (1945) ("the Board has never 
held that . . . an employer may not in good faith . . . change his business structure, sell 
or contract out a portion of his operations, or make any like change . . . without first 
consulting the bargaining representative"); see also Walter Holm & Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 
1169 (1949) ("Section 8(a)(5) does not require an employer to consult with its employees' 
representative as a prerequisite to going out of business for nondiscriminatory reasons"). 
48. See cases cited supra note 34. 
49. See NLRB v. American Nat'! Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 408 (1952) (collective bar-
gaining "has been considered to absorb and give statutory approval to the philosophy of 
bargaining as worked out in the labor movement in the United States") (quoting Order 
of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 346 (1944)). 
50. E.g., NLRB v. American Nat'! Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952). 
51. See Town & Country Mfg. Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1022, 1027 (1962) ("the elimination 
of unit jobs albeit for economic reasons, is a matter within the statutory phrase 'other 
terms and conditions of employment' and is a mandatory subject of collective bargaining 
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act"), enforced, 316 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 
1963). 
52. 379 U.S. 203 (1964). 
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B. Fibreboard and Its Progeny 
Fibreboard presented the narrow issue whether an employer's 
decision to subcontract work would be considered a mandatory 
subject of bargaining when, as a result, employees in the bar-
gaining unit were replaced by employees of an independent con-
tractor to perform the same work under similar working condi-
tions. The Court concluded that bargaining over this 
subcontracting decision could be compelled,118 though it ex-
pressly restricted its holding to the particular facts of the case. 
Justice Stewart authored an influential concurrence, setting 
forth his view of the appropriate role of unions in business 
decisionmaking: 
Nothing the Court holds today should be understood 
as imposing a duty to bargain collectively regarding such 
managerial decisions [as liquidation of assets or invest-
ment in labor-saving devices], which lie at the core of en-
trepreneurial control. Decisions concerning the commit-
ment of investment capital and the basic scope of the 
enterprise are not in themselves primarily about condi-
tions of employment, though the effect of the decision 
may be necessarily to terminate employment. If, as I. 
think clear, the purpose of§ 8(d) is to describe a limited . 
area subject to the duty of collective bargaining, those. 
management decisions which are fundamental to the ba-
sic direction of a corporate enterprise or which impinge 
only indirectly upon employment security should be ex-
cluded from that area. 114 
The Supreme Court's ruling, however, only defined the con-
tours of the debate. Cases decided after Fibreboard evinced a 
marked disagreement between the Board and the courts regard-
ing the right of unions to bargain about decisions arguably 
53. The Court marshalled several factors to support its conclusion that the decision 
to subcontract should be considered a mandatory bargaining subject. First, the decision 
had the effect of terminating employment, thus falling within the literal scope of the 
statutory "terms and conditions of employment" phraseology. Id. at 210. Second, com-
pelled bargaining in the situation at hand effectuated the purposes of the Act by "bring-
ing a problem of vital concern to labor and management within the framework estab-
lished by Congress as most conducive to industrial peace." Finally, the Court found that 
subcontracting decisions frequently were part of collective bargaining contracts, indicat-
ing that labor and management considered the subject to be one appropriate for negotia-
tion. Id. 
54. Id. at 223 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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within the "core of entrepreneurial control." The Board - de-
spite substantial opposition from the courts of appeals - con-
tinued to hold that economically motivated decisions to discon-
tinue operations and relocate,511 to reorganize marketing 
operations, 66 or to close part of a business67 were issues about 
which labor could insist upon collective bargaining. 68 
C. First National Maintenance Corp. and the Limited Scope 
of Collective Bargaining 
The Supreme Court, in First National Maintenance Corp. v. 
NLRB, 69 recently addressed this fundamental disagreement over 
the scope of an employer's obligation to negotiate with the 
union. The employer had elected to terminate an unprofitable 
maintenance and service contract, which prompted a union de-
mand to bargain with the employer over the decision.60 The em-
ployer refused, answering that the decision was purely economic 
and thus beyond the scope of the union's functions. The NLRB 
ruled, however, that the employer could be compelled to bargain 
on this subject,61 and the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit enforced the Board's order.62 
The Supreme Court disagreed. It characterized the employer's 
55. See Transmarine Navigation Corp., 152 N.L.R.B. 998 (1965), enforcement de-
nied, 380 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1967). 
56. See International Harvester Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 712 (1978), enforced on other 
grounds, 618 F.2d 85 (9th Cir. 1980). 
57. See First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., 242 N.L.R.B. 462 (1979), enforced as modi-
fied, 627 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 101 S. Ct. 2573 (1981); Thompson Transport Co., 
165 N.L.R.B. 746 (1967), enforced on other grounds, 406 F.2d 698 (10th Cir. 1969); 
Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 NLRB 561 (1966); see also NLRB v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 
361 F.2d 512 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 935 (1966) (imposing duty to bargain over 
partial-closing decisions); cf. Brockway Motor Trucks v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 
1978) (establishing presumption in favor of bargaining, subject to balancing of parties' 
interests). But see NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965) 
(denying enforcement of pre-Fibreboard order mandating bargaining); accord NLRB v. 
Adams Dairy, Inc., 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965). 
58. See generally Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 561, 566 (1966) ("whether a par-
ticular management decision must be bargained about should [not) turn on whether the 
decision involves the commitment of investment capital, or on whether it may be charac-
terized as involving 'major' or 'basic' change in the nature of the employer's business"). 
In fact, however, the Board's approach has not been wholly consistent on this question. 
See First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 101 S. Ct. 2573, 2578 & n.10 (1981). 
59. 101 S. Ct. 2573 (1981). 
60. The union demanded as well that the employer engage in collective bargaining 
over the effects of the decision to terminate this part of the business. Id. at 2576; see 
supra text accompanying notes 34-35. 
61. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., 242 N.L.R.B. 462 (1979). 
62. NLRB v. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., 627 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1980). 
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decision as involving a change in the scope and direction of the 
enterprise, akin to a decision about whether to be in business at 
all. Quoting Justice Stewart's Fibreboard concurrence, the Court 
found this subject to be "'not in [itself] primarily about condi-
tions of employment, though the effect of the decision may be 
necessarily to terminate employment.' "88 Significantly, the 
Court again endorsed reliance upon industrial custom for deter-
mining whether labor and management themselves considered 
the matter to be properly a part of collective bargaining, and 
found it to be "relatively rare" that contract provisions would 
give a union the right to participate in decisions concerning "al-
teration of the scope of the enterprise. "84 The Court set forth an 
amorphous standard for determining the nature of compulsory 
bargaining subjects: "bargaining over management decisions 
that have a substantial impact on the continued availability of 
employment should be required only if the benefit, for labor-
management relations and the collective bargaining process, out-
weighs the burden placed on the conduct of the business.',ea 
Under this calculus, the Court concluded that the potential 
harm from requiring negotiations over the contract termination 
decision outweighed any benefit to be gained from union partici-
pation. Further, the Court found that compelled bargai_ning re-
garding an employer's decision to cancel a portion of its business 
could hamper desired flexibility in management judgments, 
without significantly augmenting the flow of constructive ideas 
into the decisionmaking process. 88 
While application of the balancing test to particular business 
decisions remains to be developed, there is little question that 
the range of subjects about which bargaining may be compelled 
by labor organizations will, in part, be circumscribed by the 
range of subjects about which labor and management have bar-
gained in the past. Thus, the Court has shaped the future of 
collective bargaining according to the historically limited pat-
tern. The burden of attempting to expand the traditional areas 
63. 101 S. Ct. at 2580 (quoting Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 
203, 223 (Stewart, J., concurring)). 
64. 101 S. Ct. at 2583. 
65. Id. at 2581. 
66. Id. at 2586. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented. Citing the 
1979 negotiations between the UAW and Chrysler as a factor contributing to the com-
pany's ability to stay afloat financially, he argued that union involvement in managerial 
activities might contribute greatly to mutually satisfactory decisionmaking. In his view, 
therefore, the majority had taken account only of management interests, and had failed 
"to consider the legitimate employment interests of the workers and their Union." Id. 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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to include "management decisions that have a substantial im-
pact on the continued availability of employment"87 clearly, af-
ter First National Maintenance Corp., rests with the unions. 
In seeking the Chrysler appointment, Fraser made it apparent 
that the union had been motivated, to a substantial degree, by 
frustration over its inability to affect those management deci-
sions having a profound impact on member-employees. "Plant 
closings and relocations have hit Chrysler hard. Some may be 
inevitable, others shortsighted. The Chrysler Board needs to be 
sensitized to the suffering certain decisions inflict on workers."88 
Bargaining about severance pay and other "effects" of those de-
cisions was deemed wholly inadequate for addressing the issues 
involved - yet they were bound both by tradition and by law to 
this limited role. 
Ill. THE ENTERPRISE DIVIDED: LABOR AND MANAGEMENT AS 
SEPARATE AND DISTINCT 
In serving simultaneously as corporate director and president 
of the union, Fraser crosses a demarcation line that Congress, 
the NLRB, and the courts have painstakingly sought to define 
and preserve.89 Judicial and NLRB interpretations of the 
NLRA,70 in keeping with the intent of the 1947 congressional 
amendments,71 have distinguished between "employees," who 
alone enjoy the protections afforded by the Act, and various cat-
egories of persons whose interests have been considered more 
appropriately allied with management. The purpose and effect 
of this distinction has been to separate employer from employee, 
whose separate interests have been viewed as being, by their 
very nature, antagonistic. 
67. Id. at 2581. 
68. Fraser, supra note 4, at 13. 
69. See, e.g., NLRB v. Mt. Clemens Metal Products Co., 287 F.2d 790, 791 (6th Cir. 
1961) ("The employer is under a duty to refrain from any action which will place him on 
both sides of the bargaining table."); Nassau & Suffolk Contractors' Assoc., Inc., 118 
N.L.R.B. 174, 187 (1957) ("Employees have the right to be represented in collective bar-
gaining negotiations by individuals who have a single-minded loyalty to their interests.") 
(emphasis deleted); Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 1555-1557 (1954) ("one 
purpose of the Act was to draw a clear line of demarcation between supervisory repre-
sentatives of management and employees because of the possible conflicts in alle-
giance"). This does not mean, however, that Fraser has violated the labor laws by pursu-
ing dual roles as union president and corporate director. See infra pt. IV. 
70. See cases cited infra notes 90-91. 
71. See infra notes 77-86 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Supervisor as Employer 
The original prov1s1ons of the NLRA included all workers 
within the term "employee," and contained no disqualifying lan-
guage for those exercising supervisory authority.1ll The Board, 
except for a brief hiatus,78 ordered employers to bargain even 
with organizations made up entirely of foremen and other super-
visory employees.74 In Packard Motor Car v. NLRB,71 the Su-
preme Court approved such a bargaining order over the com-
pany's arguments that· management was entitled to its 
supervisors' loyalty. The Court held that Congress alone had the 
authority either ·to place limitations upon the right of supervi-
sors to organize or to exclude them from the Act's coverage. Jus-
tice Douglas, in dissent, placed the implications of the majority 
decision for the traditional model of labor relations in broad 
perspective: 
The present decision . . . tends to obliterate the line 
between management and labor . . . . It tends to empha-
size that the basic opposing forces in industry are not 
management and labor but the operating group on the 
one hand and the stockholder and bondholder group on 
the other. The industrial problem as so defined comes 
down to a contest over a fair division of the gross receipts 
of industry between these two groups. The struggle for 
control or power between management and labor be-
comes secondary to a growing unity in their common de-
mands on ownership . 
. . . [I]f Congress, when it enacted the National Labor 
Relations Act, had in mind such a basic change in indus-
trial philosophy, it would have left some clear and unmis-
72. 29 u.s.c. § 152(3) (1976). 
73. During the period spanning from 1942 to 1945, Board decisions took several dif-
ferent approaches to deciding the proper application of the Act to supervisory employ-
ees. In 1942, supervisors were excluded from rank-and-file units, Mueller Brass Co., 39 
N.L.R.B. 167 (1942), though their certification in separate units was permitted, Union 
Collieries Coal Co., 41 N.L.R.B. 961, supplemental decision, 44 N.L.R.B. 165 (1942), 
even if the union were affiliated with the local representing rank-and-file employees, 
Godchaux Sugars, Inc., 44 N.L.R.B. 874 (1942). In a space of two years, from 1943-1945, 
the Board held that no union could be certified to represent groups of supervisors, ex-
cept in those industries where supervisors had previously been organized. Yale & Towne 
Mfg. Co., 60 N.L.R.B. 626 (1945); Maryland Drydock Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 733 (1943). 
74. E.g., California Packing Corp., 66 N.L.R.B. 1461 (1946); Godchaux Sugars, Inc., 
44 N.L.R.B. 874 (1942); Union Collieries Coal Co., 444 N.L.R.B. 165 (1942). 
75. 330 U.S. 485 (1947), atf'g 157 F.2d 80 (6th Cir. 1946), enforcing 61 N.L.R.B. 4 
(1945). 
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takable trace of that purpose. But I find none.78 
The following year, Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Amend-
ments to the Act.77 Clearly motivated by the Packard decision,78 
Congress took up the Court's invitation by excluding from the 
definition of employee "any individual employed as a supervi-
sor. "79 While section 14(a) of the NLRA permitted supervisors 
to become or remain members of a union,80 after Taft-Hartley, 
foremen and other supervisors were no longer "employees" of 
the employer and therefore were no longer extended the protec-
tions of the Act for their concerted activities.81 This change re-
flected Congress' conclusion that management was entitled to 
complete fidelity from its supervisors - and that union mem-
bership put supervisors~ interests in conflict with those of 
management. 
During congressional deliberations over the appropriate 
breadth of the exclusion of supervisors from the collective bar-
gaining process, considerable support arose for removing super-
visors from protected status only when they were affiliated, 
either directly or indirectly, with unions of production em-
ployees.82 In this way, it was proposed, the problem of divided 
loyalty among supervisors could be met without removing their 
right to organize and bargain collectively. This approach, in fact, 
had been taken by the same Congress to obviate potential con-
flicts of interest among plant guards.88 Its application to supervi-
sors, however, was rejected on the basis that "no one, whether 
employer or employee, need have as his agent one who is obli-
gated to those on the other side. "8" Therefore, the demarcation 
76. 330 U.S. at 494-95 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
77. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (current version at 
29 U.S.C.A. §§ 141-187 (West 1973 & Supp. 1974-1980)). 
78. See S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEms-
LATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 407, 410 (1948) 
[hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 105). 
79. 29 u.s.c. § 152(3) (1976). 
80. Id. § 164(a). 
81. See generally Note, The NLRB and Supervisory Status: An Explanation of In-
consistent Results, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1713 (1981). 
82. See S. REP. No. 105, supra note 78, at 39-40 (minority views of Sen. Thomas). 
83. Section 9(b)(3), added by Taft-Hartley, prevented the Board from including in a 
rank-and-file unit "any individual employed as a guard to enforce against employees and 
other persons rules to protect property of the employer or to protect the safety of per-
sons on the employer's permises." Neither could a union affiliated with a union that 
admitted such persons be certified to represent guards. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(3) (1976). But 
guards retained the right to organize and bargain collectively. 
84. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1947), reprinted in l N.L.R.~. LEms-
LATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 292, 308 (1948); see 
236 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 15:2 
line between employer and employee was based not upon con-
cerns that supervisors would have ties to particular unions, but 
rather upon the sentiment that supervisors protected under the 
NLRA might have allegiances to employees generally.811 Employ-
ees were on the "other side"; providing supervisors with the op-
portunity to organize under the Act was viewed as allying them 
with employees and, thus, against the interests of employers.88 
In amending the Act to exclude supervisors, Congress was ad-
dressing, of course, a situation different from that posed by Fra-
ser's election to the Chrysler Board. Nonetheless, that election 
contrasts vividly with the model of labor-management relations 
Congress envisioned, in which unions and employers had dis-
tinct and conflicting interests. Congress did not perceive unions 
and employers as sharing mutual and interdependent concerns, 
as have Chrysler and the UAW. Rather, labor and management 
were seen as antagonistic entities requiring legal separation and 
protection from one another. 
B. The Manager as Employer 
The adversarial model of employment relations under the Act 
is further illustrated by the exclusion of those persons possessing 
"managerial" authority from the ambit of the Act. Neither the 
NLRA nor any of its amendments identified and excluded this 
category of persons from the protections of the statute.87 Yet the 
Board, very early, developed a policy of refusing to certify, as 
also S. REP. No. 105, supra note 78, at 5 ("It is natural to expect that unless this Con-
gress takes action, management will be deprived of the undivided loyalty of its foremen. 
There is an inherent tendency to subordinate their interests wherever they conflict with 
those of the rank and file."). 
85. The NLRB, in furtherance of this philosophy, has excluded persons as supervi-
sors solely upon a finding that they had authority to act as supervisors, even if that 
authority is rarely if ever exercised. See, e.g., Hirsch Broadcasting Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 
1780 (1956); Yamada Transfer, 115 N.L.R.B. 1330 (1956); United States Gypsum Co., 93 
N.L.R.B. 91 (1951). See generally R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 36-37 (1976). 
86. As to this development, Professor Cox said: 
The growth of foremen's unions unquestionably threatened a revolution in 
management, for to perform its responsibilities effectively the employer requires 
the foreman's undivided loyalty as its principal point of contact with the work-
ers and such loyalty cannot be secured if the foremen are psychologically allied 
with, or subject to the pressures of their union on behalf of, the rank and file. 
Cox, supra note 9, at 5. As to the legal treatment of foremen's unions generally, see 
Larrowe, A Meteor on the Industrial Relations Horizon: The Foremen's Association of 
America, 2 LAB. HlsT. 259 (1961); Levinson, Foremen's Unions and the Law, 1950 Wis. 
L. REV. 79. 
87. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., Div. of Textron, Inc., 416 U.S. 267, 275, 283, 
288 (1974). 
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inappropriate, bargaining units that included "managerial" em-
ployees together with rank-and-file employees.88 This policy re-
ceived endorsement during consideration of the Taft-Hartley 
amendments; the legislative history suggests strongly that Con-
gress agreed with the Board's policy of distinguishing between 
"management" and employees.89 Indeed, the distinction re-
mained intact for over twenty years, as the Board, with unani-
mous approval from reviewing courts,90 continued to find all 
managerial employees outside the purview of the Act.91 
In 1970, however, the Board modified its position,92 and in 
1972, in Bell Aerospace Co., Division of Textron, Inc.,93 in-
cluded buyers who were considered "management" in a bargain-
ing unit with other employees. The employer refused to bargain, 
contending that the unit was inappropriate because it contained 
managerial employees. The Board rejected this objection and 
sought enforcement of .its order to bargain, reasoning that only 
those managerial employees whose duties encompassed labor re-
lations would be susceptible to conflicts of interest. 94 
88. See Ford Motor Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 1317, 1322 (1946) ("We have customarily ex-
cluded from bargaining units of rank and file workers executive employees who are in a 
position to formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies.") (footnote omit-
ted); see, e.g., Electric Controller & Mfg. Co., 69 N.L.R.B. 1242, 1246, modified, 70 
N.L.R.B. 903 (1946); Vulcan Corp., 58 N.L.R.B. 733, 736 (1944); Spicer Mfg. Corp., 55 
N.L.R.B. 1491, 1498 (1944); Julien P. Freiz & Sons, Div. of Bendix Aviation Corp., 47 
N.L.R.B. 43, 47 (1943). See generally NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., Div. of Textron, Inc., 
416 U.S. 267, 275-77 (1974). 
89. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., Div. of Textron, Inc., 416 U.S. 267, 283-84 
(1974); R. GORMAN, supra note 85, at 37. 
90. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 1151, 1158 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970); NLRB v. North Ark. Elec. Coop., 412 F.2d 324 (8th Cir. 
1969); Illinois State Journal-Register, Inc. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 37, 41 (7th Cir. 1969); 
Continental Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 727, 730 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 902 
(1969); Retail Clerks Int'! Ass'n v. NLRB, 366 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 
386 U.S. 1017 (1967); International Ladies Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 
116, 123 (2d Cir. 1964). 
91. See, e.g., Ed's Foodland of Springfield, Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. 1256, 1260 (1966); Al-
buquerque Div., ACF Indus., 145 N.L.R.B. 403, 418-19 (1963); Eastern Camera & Photo 
Corp. 140 N.L.R.B. 569, 571 (1963); Temco Aircraft Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 1085, 1089 
(1958); Federal Tel. & Radio Co., 120 N.L.R.B. 1652, 1654 (1958); American Fed'n of 
Labor, 120 N.L.R.B. 969, 971 (1958) (dictum); Swift & Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 752, 753-54 
(1956); General Tel. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1225, 1229 (1955); Curtiss-Wright Corp., 103 
N.L.R.B. 458, 464 (1953); Denver Dry Goods Co., 74 N.L.R.B. 1167, 1175 (1947). 
92. See North Ark. Elec. Coop., 185 N.L.R.B. 550 (1970), enforcement denied, 446 
F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1971). 
93. 190 N.L.R.B. 431 (1971), enforcement denied, 475 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1973), a/f'd 
in part and reu'd in part, 416 U.S. 267 (1974). 
94. Thus, the "fundamental touchstone" was "whether the duties and responsibilities 
of any managerial employee . . . include determinations which should be made free of 
any conflict of interest which could arise if the person involved was a participating mem-
ber of a labor organization." 196 N.L.R.B. at 828. 
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The Board's approach, then, signaled an easing of the strict 
division between management and labor. By permitting certain 
managers to organize, the Board no longer envisioned employee 
organization as, by itself, antagonistic to employer inte~ests. 
Though the Board's decision recognized circumstances under 
which a manager who was also a union member might face a 
conflict between goals of management and the union, those in-
terests were not necessarily presumed to be broadly and inher-
ently at odds. 
The NLRB's easing of the division between labor and man-
agement, however, did not withstand judicial scrutiny. The 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied enforcement of 
the Board's order,911 and the Supreme Court sustained that re-
versal, concluding "that Congress intended to exclude from the 
protections of the Act all employees properly classified as 'man-
agerial' "96 regardless of whether their duties include labor rela-
tions matters. 
This broad exclusion of managers upon policy considerations 
highlights the adversarial foundation of the NLRA in two im-
portant ways. First, it embodies the consistent and universal 
view of the Board, the courts, and Congress that a division be-
tween management and labor inheres in national labor policy. 
Second, though the Board would have excluded only those man-
agerial employees susceptible to conflicts of interest - specifi-
cally, those employees exercising labor relations functions for 
the employer - the Court required exclusion of those persons 
deemed "closely aligned with management," irrespective of any 
potential for actual conflict of interest. This approach separates 
management from labor along status lines, and leads to the ine-
luctable inference that protected concerted activity and em-
ployee organization are, by their very nature, seen as antithetical 
to the interests of management. As one result, the rules of the 
contest have been drawn to place labor and management on sep-
arate, distinct, and opposing sides. In agreeing that Fraser 
should play a role in directing the company, this is a vision 
which the UAW and Chrysler have challenged. 
95. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., Div. of Textron, Inc., 475 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1973). 
96. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., Div. of Textron, Inc., 416 U.S. 267, 275 (1974) (em-
phasis added). Managerial employees were subsequently defined as "those who formulate 
and effectuate management policies by expressing and making operative the decisions of 
their employer, and those who have discretion in the performance of their jobs indepen-
dent of their employer's established policy." General Dynamics Corp., Convair Aerospace 
Div., 213 N.L.R.B. 851, 857 (1974). 
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C. Management as Labor's Adversary 
Perhaps the most germane example of the strict division be-
tween the parties wrought by the Act has been the NLRB's per-
sistent hostility toward activities of management in, or on behalf 
of, labor organizations. 97 Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA makes it 
an unfair labor practice for an employer "to dominate or inter-
fere with the formation or administration of any labor organiza-
tion or contribute financial or other support to it,"98 thereby en-
suring representation of employees' interests undiluted by subtle 
or overt influence from the employer.99 It was aimed initially at 
the employers who had established "company unions" to avoid 
"true" or adversarial collective bargaining with employee-se-
lected representatives - a phenomenon arising during the 
1920's and 1930's as a response of employers to the emerging 
influence of independent unions.10° Congress, persuaded that 
97. See generally Getman, The Midwest Piping Doctrine: An Example of the Need 
for Reappraisal of Labor Board Dogma, 31 U. Cm. L. REV. 292 (1964); Note, section 
8(a)(2): Employer Assistance to Plant Unions and Committees, 9 STAN. L. REV. 351 
(1957); Note, New Standards for Domination and Support Under Section 8(a)(2), 82 
YALE L.J. 510 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Note, New Standards]. · 
98. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1976). 
99. See International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 739 
(1961) (section 8(a)(2) goes "far to assure freedom of choice and majority rule in em-
ployee selection of representatives"); NLRB v. Mt. Clemens Metal Products Co., 287 
F.2d 790, 791 (6th Cir. 1961) ("The employer is under a duty to refrain from any action 
which will place him on both sides of the bargaining table."); Hotpoint Div., General 
Electric Co., 128 N.L.R.B. 788, 792 (1960). 
100. See R. GORMAN, supra note 85, at 195; Crager, Company Unions Under the 
National Labor Relations Act, 40 M1cH. L. REV. 831, 831-32 (1942). Passage of the Na-
tional Industrial Recovery Act, 48 Stat. 195 (1933) (held unconstitutional 1935), and par-
ticularly § 7(a) of the Act, was later seen by Congress as having given impetus to em-
ployer-sponsored labor organizations. Congress perceived this as reflecting attempts to 
avoid unionization - rather than as indicative of sincere attempts to foster employee 
self-organization. Thus, Senator Wagner remarked that "[t]he company unions that have 
come to my attention are dominated by the employer, and most of them were created as 
soon as Section 7(a) [of the National Industrial Recovery Act) became a law, and in 
order to circumvent the law." National Labor Relations Board: Hearings on S. 1958 
Before the Senate Comm. on Education & Labor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 263, 
reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 
1617, 1649 (1935). In 1935, employer-sponsored labor organizations accounted for more 
than 2.5 million workers. C. SUMMERS & H. WELLINGTON, LABOR LAW 419-20 (1968). This 
figure amounted to approximately one-fourth of all industrial employees. T. BROOKS, 
TOIL AND TROUBLE 170 (1965). Of this development, a Senate Committee declared: 
"Practically 70 percent of the employer-promoted unions have sprung up since the pas-
sage of section 7 (a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act. The testimony before the 
committee has indicated that the active entry of some employers into a vigorous compet-
itive race for the organization of workers is not conducive to peace in industry." S. REP. 
No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 11, reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 2300, 2310 (1935). 
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company unions had great potential for undermining the labor 
movement, invested the Board with broad powers under section 
8(a)(2) to eradicate employer-supported organizations. Thus, 
from its inception, the Board developed and vigorously enforced 
a rule that maintained "a strict dichotomy between labor and 
management. "101 In essence, the NLRB adopted a per se ap-
proach to allegations of unlawful interference or domination 
101. Note, New Standards, supra note 97, at 510-11; see, e.g., Ansin Shoe Mfg. Co., 1 
N.L.R.B. 929, 935 (1936) (the statutory prohibition against management domination and 
interference with labor ·organizations "must be broadly interpreted to cover any conduct 
upon the part of an employer which is intended to bring into being, even indirectly, some 
organization which he considers favorable to his interests"). 
The labor-management dichotomy has been made sweeping by the broad statutory 
interpretation and a definition given the term "labor organization," defined in § 2(5) as 
"any organization, of any kind ... in which employees participate and which exists for 
the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor 
disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment or conditions of work." 29 U.S.C. § 
152(5) (1976). In interpreting this broad definition, the Supreme Court held in NLRB v. 
Cabot Carbon, 360 U.S. 203 (1959), that a committee organized by the employer to pro-
vide "a procedure for considering employees' ideas and problems of mutual interest to 
the employees and management" was a labor organization within the meaning of§ 2(5). 
The Court concluded that the statutory phrase "dealing with" went beyond mere "bar-
gaining," and thus, because the committee discussed such matters as job classification, 
holidays, vacations, and similar matters, the organization existed at least in part for the 
purpose of "dealing with" the employer regarding terms and conditions of employment. 
Id. at 210-13. 
In keeping with this broad approach, the nature and degree of group activity required 
to meet the statutory definition of a labor organization has not been substantial. Pursu-
ant to the Cabot Carbon holding, the NLRB has found employee groupings to be labor 
organizations where the group has no constitution or officers, General Dynamics Corp., 
213 N.L.R.B. 851 (1974); East Dayton Tool & Dye Co., 194 N.L.R.B. 266 (1971), bylaws, 
Sweetwater Hospital Ass'n, 219 N.L.R.B. 803 (1975), or other formal structure, NLRB v. 
Clapper's Mfg. Inc., 458 F.2d 414 (3d Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Ampex Corp., 442 F.2d 82 (7th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 939 (1971). A group has been found to be a labor organiza-
tion though it has not entered into a collective bargaining contract, Peggs Run Coal Co. 
v. UMW Dist. 5, 475 F.2d 1396 (3d Cir. 1973); Arkay Packaging Corp., 221 N.L.R.B. 99 
(1975), or ever bargained previously, Sweetwater Hospital Ass'n, 219 N.L.R.B. 803 
(1975). Employee groups have been found to rise to the level of labor organizations even 
though characterized by the employer as a "communications committee," NLRB v. Am-
pex Corp., 442 F.2d 82 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 939 (1971), an "employees' com-
mittee or association," Eastern Indus., 217 N.L.R.B. 834 (1975); Thompson Ramo Wool-
dridge, Inc., 132 N.L.R.B. 993 (1961), enforced as modified, 305 F.2d 807 (7th Cir. 1962), 
an "oral suggestion box," NLRB v. Ampex Corp., 442 F.2d 82 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 
U.S. 939 (1971), or a committee designed to open channels of communication and bring 
the "monolithic corporation into relevant contact with its people," Arkay Packaging 
Corp., 221 N.L.R.B. 99 (1975). So long as the employee group has dealt with manage-
ment regarding working hours, overtime, lateness, absenteeism, see id., sanitary condi-
tions, inadequate ventilation, desirability of additional fringe benefits, see NLRB v. 
Clapper's Mfg., Inc., 458 F.2d 414 (3d Cir. 1972), aisle safety, or additional coffee, see 
Rupp Indus., 217 N.L.R.B. 385 (1975), it has been found to fall within the statutory 
meaning even if discussions range widely beyond traditional subjects of collective bar-
gaining, see NLRB v. Ampex Corp., 442 F.2d 82 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 939 
(1971). 
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whereby any employer involvement beyond a certain critical 
level would be found violative of the Act. 102 
This approach has been eroded to some extent, however, by 
various appellate court rulings refusing enforcement of Board 
orders to dissolve employer-supported organizations.103 More 
than the Board, these courts have attempted to distinguish em-
ployer domination or interference from cooperative efforts 
designed to enhance labor-management relations.10" Under this 
view, establishment of a section 8(a)(2) violation requires a 
showing of actual domination or interference, not merely hypo-
thetical employer overreaching. 106 The courts will consider fac-
102. See Note, New Standards, supra note 97, at 511-14. Thus, in its first published 
decision, the Board found that a "union" formed during an organizing drive to handle 
employee grievances violated § 8(a)(2). Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 1 N.L.R.B. 1 
(1935), enforced, 303 U.S. 261 (1938). Under the Board's traditional interpretation of § 
8(a)(2), for instance, employer-supported organizations could not be salvaged by a show-
ing that the employer had beneficent motives, see NLRB v. Newport News Shipbuilding 
& Drydock Co., 308 U.S. 241 (1939), or that the employees were satisfied with the organi-
zation, see St. Joseph Lead Co., 171 N.L.R.B. 541, 544-45 (1968); see also Feldman & 
Steinberg, Employee-Management Committees and the Labor Management Relations 
Act of 1947, 35 TuL. L. REV. 365, 366 (1961) ("A long line of court [and Board] decisions 
... has stricken down, with apparent mechanical regularity, a succession of plans 
whereby employers have sought to establish employee-management committees to adjust 
the multitude of day-to-day shop grievances."). For an early account of the treatment of 
company-sponsored employee groups, see Crager, supra note 100. 
103. See generally Note, New Standards, supra note 97, at 519-25. 
104. This departure from the Board's per se rule likely reflected a growing awareness 
that § 8(a)(2), in its extreme form, addressed a problem - the company union - which 
no longer existed. As early as 1947, then-Board Chairman Herzog observed that 
"[w]hatever reasons may once have existed for directing disestablishment in every case 
in which a violation of section 8 (2) was found, [he doubted] whether that remedy [was) 
invariably necessary ... [because between 1935 and 1947] employees ha[d) learned 
much about protecting their own rights and making their own choices with the full facts 
before them." Detroit Edison Co., 74 N.L.R.B. 267, 279 (1947). In 1953, he declared the 
company union problem to be "almost dead." Labor-Management Relations, 1953: 
Hearings on H. Res. 115 Before the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 83d Cong., 
1st Sess., pt. 1, at 266 (1953) (remarks of NLRB Chairman Herzog). Furthermore, in 
1972, one commentator excoriated the Board's approach as the reflection of outdated 
assumptions: 
Only in light of labor's struggle against the early company unions is the per se 
rule intelligible. Standing alone, it is not entirely logical; outright employer assis-
tance by itself need be neither detrimental nor improper . . . . The per se prohi-
bition on such assistance is understandable only when coupled with the assump-
tion that employer assistance to labor organizations is necessarily subversive to 
the interests of the employees. 
Note, New Standards, supra note 97, at 515; see also id. at 515-25 (calling for a limited 
redefinition of the approach to § 8(a)(2), not only because the threat of company union-
ism has declined, but also because employees themselves have disavowed class struggle 
pt:>litics and adversarial relationships with management). 
i05. See, e.g., NLRB v. Northeastern Univ., 601 F.2d 1208 (1st Cir. 1979); Federal-
Mogul Corp. v. NLRB, 394 F.2d 915 (1st Cir. 1968); Modern Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 379 
F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Prince Macaroni Mfg. Co., 329 F.2d 803 (1st Cir. 
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tors such as whether improper employer intent was involved in 
the providing of assistance to the employee group, 106 whether 
other coercive activities accompanied the employer support, 107 
and whether employees were precluded from selecting a differ-
ent, independent representative.108 In Hertzka & Knowles v. 
NLRB, 109 a case exemplifying the disagreement with the Board's 
per se approach, the court distilled these factors into a require-
ment that a section 8(a)(2) violation "rest on a showing that the 
employees' free choice ... is stifled by the degree of employer 
involvement at issue."11° Finding no evidence of anti-union ani-
mus or employee dissatisfaction, the court denied enforcement 
of the Board's order to dissolve employee committees that in-
cluded management representatives. Expressing sentiments 
clearly applicable to the collaborative efforts undertaken by 
Chrysler and the UAW, the court observed that "[f]or us to con-
demn this organization would mark approval of a purely adver-
sarial model of labor relations. Where a cooperative arrangement 
reflects a choice freely arrived at and where the organization is 
capable of being a meaningful avenue for the expression of em-
ployee wishes, we find it unobjectionable under the Act. "lll 
Despite these judicial initiatives, the NLRB has largely per-
sisted in its more inflexible interpretation of the scope of section 
8(a)(2).112 Thus, the Board, through its unyielding condemnation 
1964). 
106. See, e.g., NLRB v. Ampex Corp., 442 F.2d 82 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 
939 (1971); NLRB v. Newman-Green, Inc., 401 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1968); Chicago Rawhide 
Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1955). 
107. See, e.g., NLRB v. Keller Ladders Southern, Inc., 405 F.2d 663 (5th Cir. 1968); 
Coppus Eng'g Corp. v. NLRB, 240 F.2d 564 (1st Cir. 1957). 
108. See, e.g., NLRB v. Clegg, 304 F.2d 168 (8th Cir. 1962); Coppus Eng'g Corp. v. 
NLRB, 240 F.2d 564 (1st Cir. 1957); cf. Hotpoint Co. v. NLRB, 289 F.2d 683 (7th Cir. 
1961) (employee council had a right independent of employer to make and amend puta-
tively restrictive union bylaws). 
109. 503 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1974). 
110. Id. at 630. 
111. Id. at 631. 
112. More recent Board decisions have found impermissible interference or domina-
tion where employees voted for an employer-assisted committee as an alternative to rep-
resentation by an international union, e.g., Victor M. Sprys, 217 N.L.R.B. 712 (1975), 
and where representatives to an employer-assisted group had been freely elected by em-
ployees in the employer's various departments, e.g., Arkay Packaging Corp., 221 
N.L.R.B. 99 (1975); Rupp Indus., 217 N.L.R.B. 385 (1975). Violations of§ 8(a)(2) have 
been declared as well when groups were formed or assisted by the employer during an 
organizing campaign, e.g., Utrad Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 434 (1970), enforced as modified, 
454 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1971); Victor M. Sprys, 217 N.L.R.B. 712 (1975), even in the total 
absence of concurrent organizing activities, e.g., Rennselaer Polytechnic Inst., 219 
N.L.R.B. 712 (1975); Versatube Corp., 203 N.L.R.B. 456 (1973), enforced, 492 F.2d 795 
(6th Cir. 1974). Board decisions have found employer's actions violative of the Act when 
they involved conducting meetings on the employer's premises, e.g., Utrad Corp., 185 
WINTER 1982) Union Directors on Corporate Boards 243 
of employer assistance to employee groups, has viewed the Act 
as embodying a "purely adversarial model of labor relations." In 
contrast, many courts113 concur with Chrysler and the UAW 
that, under certain circumstances, cooperation and mutual assis-
tance can be salutary rather than necessarily injurious to em-
ployee interests. m 
N.L.R.B. 434 (1970), enforced as modified, 454 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1971), controlling the 
composition of the representative body, e.g., Rennselaer Polytechnic Inst., 219 N.L.R.B. 
712 (1975), participating through supervisors or other agents attending employee meet-
ings, e.g., id.; Utrad Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 434 (1970), enforced as modified, 454 F.2d 520 
(7th Cir. 1971), providing compensated time during working hours for employee meet-
ings, e.g., id., supplying clerical services or stationery, e.g., Thompson Ramo Wooldridge, 
Inc., 132 N.L.R.B. 993 (1961), enforced as modified, 305 F.2d 807 (1962), or assisting 
with legal services, e.g., Versatube Corp., 203 N.L.R.B. 456 (1973), enforced, 492 F.2d 795 
(6th Cir. 1974). 
113. See supra notes 103-111 and accompanying text; see also NLRB v. Magic 
Slacks, Inc., 314 F.2d 844 (7th Cir. 1963); NLRB v. Post Publishing, 311 F.2d 565 (7th 
Cir. 1962); NLRB v. Valentine Sugars, Inc., 211 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1954). 
114. Other experiments with cooperative labor relations have met with mixed judicial 
treatment as a result of the adversarial assumptions implicit in the NLRA. Nevertheless, 
employers and unions have recently engaged in a great deal of experimentation with 
employee groupings working on a cooperative basis. Inspired .by the success of Japanese 
manufacturers in using a consensus approach to labor-management relations, see gener-
ally R. CoLE, WORK, MOBILITY, AND PARTICIPATION (1979); W. Oucm, THEORY Z: How 
AMERICAN BUSINESS CAN MEET THE JAPANESE CHALLENGE (1981); E. VOGEL, JAPAN AS 
NUMBER ONE (1979); How Japan Does It, TIME, Mar. 30, 1981, at 54, these experiments 
- termed quality circles or quality-of-work-life programs - are occurring across a range 
of domestic industries., It has been estimated that some 750 employers - including 
Lockheed, Polaroid, Dana, TRW, Procter & Gamble, Herman Miller, and Northrop -
are introducing such programs. Burck, What Happens When Workers Manage Them-
selves, FORTUNE, July 27, 1981, at 62. Moreover, major unions - including the UAW, the 
United Steelworkers of America, the Communication Workers of America, and the Inter-
national Brotherhood of Electrical & Telecommunications International Union - have 
signed national labor agreements containing commitments to q·uality-of-work-life pro-
grams. Burck, What's In It For The Unions, FORTUNE, Aug. 24, 1981, at 88; At G.M. 's 
Buick Unit, Workers and Bosses Get Ahead by Getting Along, N.Y. Times, "uly 5, 1981, 
§ 3, at 4, col. 3; A Search for Quality: Detroit Tries It All, Wash. Post, Aug. 23, 1981, at 
GI, col. 1. While the election of Fraser constitutes an experiment with nonadversarial 
labor-management relations at the highest level of corporate governance, these innova-
tions may be viewed as cooperative efforts at the opposite end of the enterprise. 
Comprehensive treatment of the quality-of-work-life experiments must await another 
day; nonetheless, some preliminary observations can be made. It has generally been as-
sumed, in keeping with the broad definition of a "labor organization" enunciated in 
NLRB v. Cabot Carbon, 360 U.S. 203 (1959); see supra note 77, that employer involve-
ment in such programs would be violative of the NLRA. "Assessed in terms of [the] 
specific prohibitions [against employer assistance) ... , the [production] team is clearly 
a dominated and supported labor organization." Note, Does Employer Implementation 
of Employee Production Teams Violate Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations 
Act?, 49 IND. L.J. 516, 531 (1974); see Murmann, The Scanlon Plan Joint Committee 
and Section 8(a)(2), 31 LAB. L.J. 299 (1980). Despite this well-established doctrine, the 
Board has revealed some greater degree of tolerance for nonadversarial employee group-
ings. See General Foods Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1232 (1977); Mercy-Memorial Hospital 
Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1108 (1977); Sparks-Nugget, Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. 275 (1977). Signifi-
cantly, however, these decisions have been based not upon a distinction between em-
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IV. VARIATIONS ON THE THEME: THE BOARD'S TREATMENT OF 
DEVIATIONS FROM TRADITIONAL ROLES OF LABOR AND 
MANAGEMENT 
In light of the adversarial model of labor-management rela-
tions envisioned by the NLRA, it might well be asked whether 
and to what extent the law will accommodate deviations - such 
as Fraser's recent elevation to the Chrysler Board - from the 
traditional roles taken by labor and management. Specifically, 
under what circumstances will a representative of an employer 
or employees be permitted to adopt a dual role, engaging in ac-
tivities on behalf of both labor and management? 
Examination of NLRB decisions reveals several touchstones 
for evaluating such conflict-of-interest questions. First, Board 
conflict-of-interest doctrine has centered upon the potential 
harm inflicted upon employee interests by conflicts arising from 
abuses of position; essentially, the Board seeks to protect em-
ployee interests rather than those of the employer or competi-
tors. 1111 Second, the Board maintains a behavioral assumption 
that representatives do not alter their allegiances when perform-
ing functions for the other side. 116 Management representatives 
in unions, then, are presumed to remain loyal to management, 
a:pd union representatives involved in management affairs like-
wise are presumed to remain loyal to the union. With these per-
spectives in mind, a consistent approach can be derived from the 
cases reviewing the legality of dual roles for union or manage-
ment representatives. 
A. Employers Involved in Union A/fairs 
On its face, the NLRA gives employees complete freedom in 
player "interference" and "cooperation," but rather upon a limitation of the breadth of 
the definition of a "labor organization" under § 2(5). Thus, the Board's tolerance of these 
nonadversarial undertakings does not reflect any deviation from its presumption that an 
employer's purpose in assisting a labor organization is to subvert the actual interests of 
employees. 
115. Thus, in Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 1555 (1954), where the 
union owned a company that competed directly with the employer, the Board disquali-
fied the union not because of a threat to the employer, but rather because of the poten-
tial that the union might protect its investment by less vigorously representing the em-
ployees. See id. at 1559-60; see also Nassau & Suffolk Contractors' Ass'n, 118 N.L.R.B. 
174, 185 (1957) ("Congress has not seen fit to make it an unfair labor practice for a labor 
organization to dominate or interfere with the administration of an employer's busi-
ness"). 
116. See infra text accompanying notes 122-29. 
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their choice of representatives. Section 7 gives employees the 
right "to bargain collectively through representatives of their 
own choosing."117 Section 9(c)(l)(A) provides for the filing of a 
representation petition by "any individual" acting on behalf of 
employees,118 and section 2(4) defines the term "representative" 
as including "any individual."119 Nevertheless, as a matter of 
policy, the Board has held, for example, that a supervisor may 
not represent the employees of his employer for collective bar-
gaining purposes, notwithstanding that the employees freely se-
lected him as their representative.120 Indeed, the NLRB has not 
wavered in its condemnation of any substantial involvement by 
employer representatives in internal union affairs.121 Thus, in 
Columbia Pictures Corp., 122 the Board refused to process a rep-
resentation petition where supervisors had participated in the 
formation of the union. Similarly, in Nassau & Suffolk Contrac-
tors' Association, Inc., 123 where two of the twelve members of 
the union's negotiating team were supervisors, the Board found 
a violation of section 8(a)(2), observing that it was "improper for 
supervisors, even those with predominantly union loyalty, to 
serve as negotiating representatives of employees. "124 
Consistent with this reasoning, where a supervisor of the em-
ployer served also as union steward, the Board found an imper-
missible intermingling of supervisory and employee-representa-
tive functions which deprived the employees of their right to be 
represented in collective bargaining matters by individuals hav-
ing "single-minded loyalty to their interest."1211 More signifi-
cantly, in Employing Bricklayers' Association, 128 the Board 
117. 29 u.s.c. § 157 (1976). 
118. Id. § 159(c)(l)(A). 
119. Id. § 152(4). 
120. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 1555 (1954). The authority to dis-
qualify bargaining representatives was established in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corp., 331 U.S. 416, 422 (1937), where the Supreme Court made clear the Board's "dis-
cretion to place appropriate limitations on the choice of bargaining representatives 
should it find that public or statutory policies so dictate." 
121. See generally supra pt. III C. 
122. 94 N.L.R.B. 466 (1951). 
123. 118 N.L.R.B. 174 (1957). 
124. Id. at 187. The Board reasoned: 
Employees have the right to be represented in collective-bargaining negotiations 
by individuals who have a single-minded loyalty to their interests. Conversely, 
an employer is under duty to refrain from any action which will interfere with 
that employee right and place him in slight degree on both sides of the bargain-
ing table. 
Id;' accord St. Louis Labor Health Inst., 230 N.L.R.B. 180 (1977). 
125. E.E.E. Co., 171 N.L.R.B. 982, 982 (1968). 
126. 134 N.L.R.B. 1535 (1961). 
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found a section 8(a)(2) violation where the employer's executive 
secretary merely voted for delegates to the union's international 
convention. The employer contended that its involvement was 
related only tangentially to the representation process, but the 
Board dismissed this argument by asserting that very few mat-
ters within the concern of unions are unrelated to the represen-
tation process. That the management official was a union mem-
ber and may well have been acting in the perceived best interest 
of the union was deemed irrelevant because, in the Board's view, 
participation in such union affairs should be reserved for "union 
members who have no divided loyalties."127 Here, the manager's 
vote represented "the judgment of a person with dual loyalties, 
which are not always easily reconcilable."128 
Therefore, where a representative of management also under-
takes duties on behalf of the union, thus assuming a dual role, 
such action will be condemned though the duties be far removed 
from collective bargaining and though no actual wrongdoing be 
established. The manager is presumed loyal to management, and 
the Board position guards against the mere potential for under-
mining employees' interests.129 As a result, were Fraser consid-
ered a management representative - a tenable position, given 
the important role he plays in the governance of Chrysler - his 
continued active involvement in the union would be proscribed. 
In fact, however, the view that a labor representative such as 
Fraser could become one with management has not prevailed in 
NLRB decisions addressing the elevation of union officials to 
corporate governing boards. 
B. Union Representation on Corporate Boards Under the 
NLRA 
While Fraser sits as one of twenty members of Chrysler's 
board of directors, he serves also as the union's chief spokesman 
during contract negotiations with Chrysler and the other major 
127. Id. at 1537. 
128. Id.; see G & H Towing Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 589, 590, 596-97 (1967); Powers Reg\1-
lator Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 1185, 1188 (1964), enforced, 355 F.2d 506 (7th Cir. 1966); 
Bottfield-Refractories Co., 127 N.L.R.B. 188 (1960), sub nom. NLRB v. Employing 
Bricklayers' Ass'n, 292 F.2d 627 (3d. Cir. 1961); Nassau & Suffolk Contractors' Ass'n, 118 
N.L.R.B. 174, 183 (1957). 
129. Under certain circumstances, the Board has permitted some erosion of this prin-
ciple. In the construction industry, for example, where skilled supervisors might move 
from a unit position into supervision and back again, the Board has allowed low-level 
supervisors to be included in the bargaining unit. See, e.g., Nassau & Suffolk Contrac-
tors' Ass'n, Inc., 118 N.L.R.B. 174 (1957). 
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automobile manufacturers. He remains actively involved in de-
veloping and defining the UAW's collective bargaining stance, in 
modifying positions taken during negotiations, and in determin-
ing whether contract proposals should be accepted.130 Although 
not a daily participant in negotiations, he does, on occasion, at-
tend such sessions on behalf of the union. 
In addition to these UAW duties, Fraser as a member of the 
Chrysler Board votes upon a wide range of issues confronting 
the corporation. His involvement on the Board does not extend 
to corporate debates regarding bargaining strategy with the 
UAW, but otherwise he "participate[s] fully in deliberations on 
all other matters, ... including ... collective bargaining poli-
cies and other worker concerns, such as health and safety, plant 
closings and transfers, new technology, product planning, major 
investments and equal employment opportunities and 
practices. " 131 
Such activities of an employee representative acting as corpo-
rate decisionmaker likely will be scrutinized for a variety of po-
tential conflicts of interest. Perhaps the best example is the em-
ployee representative who participates, as does Fraser, in 
decisions regarding plant relocation or closure, subcontracting of 
unit work, adoption of labor-saving devices, or other matters 
which have immediate effects upon jobs or job be~efits. If the 
director accepts such policy changes in these matters, claims 
from adversely affected employees are likely to follow; if the di-
rector resists such developments, questions regarding the direc-
tor's duty to shareholders become apparent.18ll 
130. NLRB Advice Memorandum, Case No. 7-CB-4815, 1980-81 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 11 
20,269, at 33,476 (Oct. 22, 1980). 
131. CHRYSLER CORP., NOTICE 01' ANNUAL MEETING 01' STOCKHOLDERS AND PRoxv 
STATEMENT 10 (May 13, 1980) (state~ent of Douglas A. Fraser). 
132. Questions about Fraser's fiduciary duties to shareholders, as distinct from his 
obligations to UAW members, while beyond the scope of this Article, are far from set-
tled. There is a division of authority regarding whether a corporate officer's fiduciary 
duty runs to the corporation as an entity, or to the shareholders themselves. Compare 15 
PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 1408 (Purdon Supp. 1981-1982) (director's duty runs to the cor-
poration), with N."C. GEN. STAT. § 55-35 (1975) (duty runs both to corporation and to 
shareholders). The weight of authority, however, holds that a director's duty runs to the 
corporation. See A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROP-
ERTY 221-26 (1939); H. HENN, HANDBOOK or THE LAw or CORPORATIONS AND OTHER Busi-
NESS ENTERPRISES § 238 (2d ed. 1971). As a result, a majority of courts will not void a 
board decision that is fair and reasonable to the corporation, merely because a director 
with an outside interest participated in making the decision. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 
U.S. 295, 306 (1939); Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 405, 
241 P.2d 66 (1952); Fill Bldgs., Inc. v. Alexander Hamilton Life Ins. Co., 396 Mich. 453, 
· 241 N.W.2d 466 (1976); see also MODEL BUSINESS CoRP. ACT § 41 (1979). See generally 
Note, supra note 6, at 652-60. 
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Based upon the limited, adversarial model of labor-manage-
ment relations embodied in Board law, a wide range of activities 
by management representatives in union affairs is proscribed.188 
Because the Act seeks to protect the interests of employees, m 
the parallel question arises whether a parti~ipatory role for labor 
representatives in business decisionmaking, by itself, tends to 
undermine the interests of employees. Put another way, does the 
law . require that union officials, like Caesar's wife, be above 
suspicion? 
In light of the traditional model of labor-management rela-
tions, the instances in which union representation on corporate 
governing boards have been challenged are understandably few. 
This has led some to presume mistakenly that such actions 
would be assessed under the same standards as are applied to 
determining the propriety of management activities on behalf of 
unions.181 Though the Board has passed upon the question only 
a few times, and by its own admission has yet to articulate a test 
broadly applicable to such questions, 188 case law does reveal that 
union officials such as Fraser will be liberally permitted to serve 
upon the governing boards of enterprises employing their mem-
bers; while simultaneously retaining their representative status 
- unless union representatives comprise a majority of the cor-
porate board, or unless the union has a direct financial interest 
in the company.187 
The NLRA contains no specific prohibition against union ac-
tivities in corporate governance or management, 188 but the 
Board nonetheless possesses undisputed authority to disqualify 
persons from acting as employee representatives based upon 
133. See supra pt. IV A. 
134. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
135. See Murphy, Workers on the Board: BGrrowing a European Idea, 27 LAB. L.J. 
751, 753-54 (1976); Comment, supra note 8, at 969-70. The argument runs that a union 
officer serving as corporate director could be viewed as a supervisor engaging in impor-
tant union affairs, thus violating § 8(a)(2). A variant on this approach would find union 
representation on a corporate board violative of § 8(a)(2) whenever an employer initiated 
and implemented the plan. See Note, The West German Model of Codetermination 
Under Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 51 IND. L.J. 795, 812 (1976). These analyses, 
though, seemingly give short shrift to NLRB decisions approaching the question as one 
of conflict of interest, where the union representative is presumed to remain loyal to 
member-employees despite involvement with the corporate board; see infra notes 141-45 
and accompanying text. 
136. See NLRB Advice Memorandum, Case No. 7-CB-4815, 1980-81 NLRB Dec. 
(CCH) ,r 20,269, at 33,476 (Oct. 22, 1980). 
137. See NLRB v. Pinkerton's, Inc., 621 F.2d 1322, 1326-27 (6th Cir. 1980); Sierra 
Vista Hospital, Inc., 241 N.L.R.B. 631, 633-34 (1979). 
138. See Nassau & Suffolk Contractors' Ass'n, 118 N.L.R.B. 174, 185 (1957). 
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conflict-of-interest considerations.139 The NLRB has seldom ex-
ercised this discretion, however, in the face of the cardinal policy 
of freedom of selection of representatives. Ho This reflects the 
Board's apparent conclusion that union participation in corpo-
rate governance does not, by itself, work to the detriment of em-
ployees; union officials engaged in activities on behalf of man-
agement are assumed to remain loyal to the union, 141 thus 
posing no threat to employees' interests. 
In Anchorage Community Hospital, Inc., 141 for example, 
union representatives sat both on the employer's board of trust-
ees and on the executive management committee that reviewed 
and approved the governing labor contract. Indeed, of the fifteen 
trustees who comprised the board, seven were also union repre-
sentatives. Emphasizing that the union representatives still con-
stituted a minority of the board, the NLRB held that in the ab-
sence of evidence that the union had, in fact, sacrificed the 
employee's interests to advance those of the employer, the pres-
ence of union representatives on the employer's governing board 
would not be violative of the Act.Ha Similarly, in Child Day 
Care Center,H• a union whose local represented the employees 
of a child day-care center also appointed half of the members of 
the board of trustees that administered funds for the day-care 
center. Moreover, the chairman of the board of trustees was 
himself a union official. Nevertheless, the NLRB found that 
these intertwined relationships among labor and management 
did not preclude the union's representation of the day-care 
center employees, because union officials did not represent a ma-
jority on the board of trustees, and no other factors suggested 
that the union could not "approach negotiations with the single-
minded _purpose of protecting and advocating the interests of 
139. See sup.ra note 120. 
140. See NLRB v. David Buttrick Co., 399 F.2d 505, 507 (1st Cir. 1968) ("There is a 
strong public policy favoring the free choice of a bargaining agent by employees. The 
choice is not lightly to be frustrated."). 
141. Fraser has repeatedly emphasized that he intends to represent the interests of 
employees while serving as a corporate director. See, e.g., The Risk in Putting a Union 
Chief on the Board, Bus. WK., May 19, 1980, at 149; Lett, Fraser to Quit at Chrysler, 
Detroit News, Apr. 13, 1982, at 1, col. 6 (Responding to speculation that he might stay on 
as a corporate director after retiring from the presidency of the UAW, Fraser observed, 
"I think that sort of runs counter to why I'm there in the first place - as a representa-
tive of the workers."); Simison, UAW's Fraser to Speak Out for Labor, Public in Role as 
Director at Chrysler, Wall St. J., Oct. 29, 1979, at 6, col. 2. 
142. 225 N.L.R.B. 575 (1976). 
143. Id. at 575. 
144. 242 N.L.R.B. 1177 (1980). 
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employees. " 145 
Once union representatives constitute a majority of the em-
ployer's governing body, however, a different perspective 
prevails. At this point, the Board seemingly considers the pre-
sumption of continuing loyalty to be inapplicable. In the rare 
event where union officials have garnered a majority on the em-
ployer's board of directors, the NLRB has concluded that the 
union no longer can advocate effectively the interests of employ-
ees. 146 In Centerville Clinics, Inc., 147 for instance, the Board 
found a section 8(a)(2) violation where 112 members of the em-
ployer's 114-member board of directors were union officials. 
Aside from union domination of the employer's governing 
body, the other factor that triggers reversal of the presumption 
of continuing loyalty is a union's direct, substantial pecuniary 
interest in the company whose employees it represents.148 Such a 
financial interest, especially when combined with union involve-
145. Id.; cf. UMW Welfare & Retirement Fund, 192 N.L.R.B. 1022 (1971) (violation 
of § 8(a)(2) found where supervisors actually participated in the daily activities of the 
local union). 
146. Questions regarding the lawfulness of a union's continuing representation likely 
will arise in situations where employees purchase a plant from the employer pursuant to 
an employee stock option plan or other similar arrangement. See generally Granados, 
Employee Stock Option Plans: An Analysis of Current Reform Proposals, 14 U. MICH. 
J.L. REF. 15 (1980); Note, Employee Stock Ownership Plans: A Step Toward Demo-
cratic Capitalism, 55 B.U.L. REV. 195 (1975). If, under these circumstances, union repre-
sentatives take a majority of positions on the corporate board, the union's continued 
representation of the employees likely would be voidable; in this event, the Board appar-
ently considers that the employees have effectively become the employer. See, e.g., supra 
note 24 (describing employees' decision to purchase a majority share in the Rath Packing 
Company, which in turn led to a union majority on the 16-member corporate board). 
Such sales to employees have occurred in the automobile industry. In November 1981, 
for instance, General Motors sold its Clark, New Jersey, Hyatt roller-hearing plant to 
employees. The Disaster in Detroit, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 9, 1981, at 66. Proposals to sell 
Ford Motor Company plants in Sheffield, Alabama, and Northville, Michigan, were un-
successful when sale terms could not be reached. Detroit Free Press, Mar. 18, 1981, at 
IA, col. 2; Detroit Free Press, Nov. 24, 1981, at IA, col. 2. Such developments may well 
be on the increase. See Woodworth, supra note 24, at A27, col. I ("With an alarming 
increase in the incidence of plant closings . . . conversion to worker ownership may be-
come an important strategy for economic survival for the decades ahead."). 
147. 181 N.L.R.B. 135 (1970). 
148. A few cases have recognized that a disqualifying conflict of interest can arise as 
well where a union has a financial stake in a competitor of the employer. See, e.g., NLRB 
v. H.P. Hood, Inc., 496 F.2d 515 (1st Cir. 1974) (loan made from the union's pension 
fund to a competitor of the employer); NLRB v. David Buttrick Co., 399 F.2d 505 (1st 
Cir. 1968) (same); Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 1555 (1954) (union owned a 
direct competitor of the employer). Such an interest could cause the union to pursue 
policies in derogation of the interests of both the employer and employees. See generally 
Note, Confiict of Interest Problems Arising From Union Pension Fund Loans, 67 
CoLUM. L. REV. 162 (1967); Note, Union Investment in Business: A Source of Union 
Conflicts of Interest, 46 MINN. L. REV. 573 (1962). · 
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ment in managing the employer's operations, may place the 
union in the untenable position of deciding between the inter-
ests of its constituents and the furtherance of its investments -
thereby creating a disqualifying conflict of interest under the 
Act. Thus, in both Centerville Clinics and Medical Foundation 
of Bellaire, 149 an important factor contributing to the finding of 
violations was the financial dependency of the employer upon 
the union, in addition to the substantial union representation on 
the employer's governing board.160 
The twin elements that could cause union involvement in cor-
porate management to be considered violative of the NLRA 
manifestly are not presented by Fraser's election to the Chrysler 
Board. Fraser is distinctly a minority voice on the Board; in con-
trast to Anchorage Community Hospital, Inc., 1111 where a 
fifteen-member board having seven union representatives did 
not violate the Act, labor occupies only one position on 
Chrysler's twenty-member Board.1611 Furthermore, the union 
does not have a financial interest in Chrysler that could create a 
disqualifying conflict of interest. Although the UAW clearly has 
an interest in Chrysler's prosperity, this is no more a financial 
stake than any employees have in the success of their employer, 
and does not pose the threat that the union would subjugate the 
interests of the workers to advance its own concerns. 1118 
149. 193 N.L.R.B. 62 (1971). 
150. In these decisions, the Board has identified the pecuniary ties between union 
and employer that support its finding of a conflict of interest, without delving into the 
question whether certain levels of financial involvement alone would be sufficient to es-
tablish a disqualifying conflict. In Anchorage Community Hospital, 225 N.L.R.B. 575 
(1976), the Board suggested that a conflict of interest would be engendered only if the 
employer had a substantial financial dependency upon the union. Although the union 
had made construction loans to the employer, this financial involvement was "not suffi-
ciently large to present a danger that Respondent Union would subvert the bargaining 
rights of the unit employees," id. at 575; cf. NLRB v. David Buttrick Co., 399 F.2d 505 
(1st Cir. 1968) (a disqualifying conflict was not established where the union made a sub-
stantial loan to a competitor of the employer, because the union did not have an "equity-
like interest" in the competitor and therefore had no incentive to manipulate the inter-
ests of the employer and employees). 
151. 225 N.L.R.B. 575 (1976); see supra text accompanying note 142. 
152. See NLRB Advice Memorandum, Case No. 7-CB-4815, 1980-81 NLRB Dec. 
(CCH) 11 20,269, at 33,478 (Oct. 22, 1980) ("the Union, in the person of Fraser, holds only 
one position on the Board of Directors out of 20, clearly not such a significant number as 
would present a conflict of interest."). 
153. The UAW does not "wish to see Chrylser [sic] flourish at the expense of the 
employees"; rather, "the Union's only interest in the financial state of Chrysler is to 
insure maximum jobs and benefits for the employees." See id. 
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C. Third-Party Employers 
The conflict of interest questions raised by Fraser's election to 
the Chrysler Board are made more complex by the UA W's rep-
resentation of the employees of Chrysler's domestic competi-
tors.164 Regardless of the position adopted by the UAW in nego-
tiations with any one automobile manufacturer, doubts may 
arise concerning the propriety of the union's approach. Thus, 
should the UAW grant concessions to Chrysler,105 employees of 
General Motors, Ford, and American Motors may well perceive 
their long-term interests being sacrificed for those of Chrysler 
and its employees. Indeed, this conflict already is more than 
conjectural. A recent study indicates that Chrysler, by virtue of 
wage and benefit compromises made by the UAW, will save sev-
eral hundred dollars on every car produced. 1118 Though Chrysler 
might argue that these concessions merely redress its economy 
of scale disadvantages, employees at competing auto manufac-
turers could legitimately view these cost savings as a threat to 
their job security and the profitability of their employers - and 
ultimately to their future wages and fringe benefits.1117 In turn, 
solicitude for the interests of the employees of other domestic 
manufacturers conceivably could cause Fraser to alter his ap-
proach in representing the Chrysler workers. 
In decisions addressing conflicts of interest arising from third-
party considerations, however, the Board has been even less will-
ing than with cases involving dual roles for union representatives 
to find a disqualifying conflict of interest. Again, this reluctance 
154. This combination of relationships is not likely to be limited to the UAW and the 
automobile manufacturers. If, as some believe, a precondition to union participation on 
employers' governing boards is the financial debility of the employer, see supra note 24 
and accompanying text, such ventures can be expected in the large, manufacturing sec-
tors of the economy, such as steel and rubber, which have suffered declining market 
shares over the past decade. Cf. supra note 4 (discussing ventures in the airline indus-
try). Because these sectors are characterized by large, industry-wide unions, it is proba-
ble that placement of a union representative on any one corporate board will create po-
tential conflict of interest problems with competitors, see supra note 4 (discussing the 
unwillingness of the Justice Department to approve appointment of a UAW representa-
tive to the American Motors Board following the Chrysler-UAW undertaking). 
155. See, e.g., NLRB Advice Memorandum, Case No. 7-CB-4815, 1980-81 NLRB 
Dec. (CCH) ,r 20,269, at 33,478 n.1 (in return for Fraser's election to the Chrysler Board, 
the UAW collective bargaining agreement with Chrysler called for wage increases $203 
million less than provided for in earlier packages negotiated with General Motors and 
Ford). 
156. Detroit Free Press, Feb. 1, 1981, at IA, col. 5. 
157. Cf. Wall St. J., Nov. 11, 1979, at 4, col. 1 (allegations by the Chairman of Gen-
eral Motors that Fraser's directorship would create fundamental conflicts of interest 
which could upset future labor negotiations). 
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is grounded in the overriding desire to avoid intrusions into em-
ployees' freedom to select their bargaining representatives. 1118 
In the leading case of Sierra Vista Hospital, Inc., 1119 the Board 
set forth its approach to situations presenting potential conflicts 
of interest resulting from union allegiances to third parties. 
Where a supervisor of a third-party employer participated ac-
tively in internal union affairs, the Board recognized the possi-
bility that this could "impinge" upon the employees' right to a 
bargaining representative whose undivided concern is for their 
interests."160 Nonetheless, the Board concluded, mere involve-
ment of third-party employers in the union would not itself be 
sufficient to disqualify a bargaining representative; in the ab-
sence of "a showing that danger of a conflict of interest interfer-
ing with the collective bargaining process is clear and present," 
there would be no impermissible conflict.181 
Under this approach, Fraser's allegiances with Chrysler would 
not be considered sufficient to create a conflict of interest dis-
qualifying him from representing the employees of competing 
domestic auto manufacturers. The NLRB does not consider it 
significant that Fraser's objective of ensuring the solvency of 
Chrysler, when serving as a member of the corporate board or 
when representing the Chrysler workers, might make it more 
difficult for him to approach negotiations with Chrysler's com-
petitors with a single-minded desire to advance the interests of 
their employees. The Board would require hard evidence, not 
merely conjecture, before finding that Fraser's third-party ties 
created a "clear and present danger" of an impermissible con-
flict of interest. 162 Thus, the NLRA, although conceived and ad-
158. See supra note 106. 
159. 241 N.L.R.B. 631 (1979). 
160. Id. at 633. 
161. Id. (quoting NLRB v. David Buttrick Co., 399 F.2d 505, 507 (1st Cir. 1968)). In 
cases subsequent to Sierra Vista, the Board has rejected allegations of disqualifying con-
flicts of interest arising from third-party entanglements where supervisors of competitors 
were involved in union affairs, including high executive positions, but did not engage in 
the actual collective-bargaining process. See, e.g., Lodi Memorial Hospital Ass'n, Inc., 
249 N.L.R.B. 786 (1980); Baptist Hospitals, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 170 (1979). 
Only intimate alliances between the union and third-party interests have been held 
sufficient to create a disqualifying conflict. See, e.g., Welfare & Pension Funds, 178 
N.L.R.B. 14 (1969) (local bargaining unit had "direct and immediate allegiances" to a 
parent union); General Teamsters, Local 249, 139 N.L.R.B. 605 (1962) (both the em-
ployer and the local unit were members of the same federation of local unions); Oregon 
Teamsters' Security Plan Office, 119 N.L.R.B. 207 (1957) (union attempted to represent 
its own employees); see also Bausch & Lomb Opti~ Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 1555 (1954) 
(union owned a direct competitor of the employer, and thus was in the position of choos-
ing between furthering its investment and representing the unit employees). 
162. See NLRB Advice Memorandum, Case No. 7-CB-4815, 1980-81 NLRB Dec. 
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ministered on the assumptions that comprise a limited, adver-
sarial model of labor-management relations, will not prevent the 
Chrysler-UAW departure from that model. 
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DEPARTURE 
Whether this new-found marriage between labor and manage-
ment will become a key to Chrysler's financial recovery remains 
to be seen. Furthermore, only time will tell whether such a coop-
erative venture, like other innovations born in the automobile 
industry, will become a widely accepted union practice. 
Whatever the benefits of this venture, however, the Board's lib-
eral acceptance of union involvement in management activities 
poses serious implications, particularly for disaffected individual 
member-employees. 
A. - The Presumption of Loyalty 
The Board's conflict of interest decisions reveal a presumption 
that union representatives engaged in corporate decisionmaking 
remain faithful to the interests of employees. 188 In fact, though, 
considerable evidence from the social sciences suggests that this 
presumption may be seriously misplaced.184 Furthermore, at 
(CCH) 11 20,269, at 33,477 (Oct. 22, 1980) ("Although it ia conceivable that the Union 
would take 'harsh' positions in bargaining with other auto manufacturers for the purpose 
of injuring them and benefiting Chrysler, there is no evidence to indicate that the Union 
or Fraser has done that or plans to do that."). 
163. See supra note 141. 
164. "[T]he members of any enduring group are likely to display a striking homoge-
neity of beliefs, attitudes, values, and behavior." GROUP DYNAMICS 139 (D. Cartwright & 
A. Zander 3d ed. 1968). While the strength and effectiveness of forces toward uniformity 
depend upon many variables, there is no longer any question that groups exert influences 
which can and do result in conforming opinions and behavior patterns. See L. F'EsT-
INGER, S. SCHACTER & K. BACK, SOCIAL PRESSURES IN INFORMAL GROUPS 151-76 (1950). 
Although the forces inducing uniformity among group members are not fully under-
stood, voluminous empirical research conducted over the past three decades suggests 
they fall into two general categories. First, there are forces arising from conflicts within a 
person who observes that his opinion or actions differ from those of the group. See Fest-
inger & Aronson, The Arousal and Reduction of Dissonance in Social Contexts, in 
GROUP DYNAMICS, supra, at 125. Second, there are forces brought to bear by other group 
members seeking to influence the person's beliefs. Thus, group pressures may cause indi-
vidual group members to alter their opinions, even as to matters of observable fact, to 
conform to the opinions of the group. See GROUP DYNAMICS, supra, at 130-40; Asch, Ef • 
fects of Group Pressure Upon the Modification and Distortion of Judgments, in 
GROUPS, LEADERSHIP & MEN 177 (H. Guetzkow ed. 1951 & photo. reprint 1962). Indeed, 
where a single individual ia a minority of one against an otherwise-unanimous majority, 
as may well be the case with Fraser, the pressure toward conformity could be even 
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least one NLRB member has observed that intimate involve-
ment in management and the operations of the employer might 
alter the union's commitment to the bargaining unit - not be-
cause of corruption of interests in the traditional sense, but be-
cause involvement in management affairs may make the union 
representative more attuned to management objectives and less 
sensitive to employee goals.180 
If this danger is present even in normal business settings, it is 
manifestly greater dramatically where an employer such as 
Chrysler is engaged in a struggle for its very existence. 166 While 
it may be true that the goals of management and employees are 
the same in many ways, it is just as true that many times they 
conflict. After wrestling with managerial problems in his capac-
ity as corporate directoi:, could Fraser, or anyone, represent as 
vigorously the employees in a dispute with Chrysler over, for ex-
ample, a proposed speedup of the production line? As an officer 
of the corporation, Fraser would have full appreciation of, and 
indeed, great responsibility for Chrysler's financial solvency. 
Under these circumstances, could he, with the same detachment 
as before his election, protest an increased workload or select the 
next strike ta.,get? The possibilty arises then, that employees 
will be deprived of single-minded union representation, in dero-
gation of their rights under the NLRA. 
B. Redress for Inadequate Representation 
If employees whose union has secured a seat on their em-
ployer's governing board become dissatisfied with the quality of 
union representation, their avenues of recourse are limited. An 
greater. See Asch, supra, at 185-88. 
At the same time, by being a member of two groups, the Union and the Board, Fraser 
will be influenced by frequently contradictory norms. Though the effect of conflicting 
pressure from different reference groups has been studi~d in various contexts, see, e.g., 
T.M. NEWCOMB, Soc1AL PSYCHOLOGY 528-71 (1950); Killian, The Significance of Multi-
Group Membership in Disaster, 57 AM. J. Soc. 309 (1952); Singer, Reference Groups 
and Social Evaluations, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 66, 76 (M. Rosenberg & R. Turner eds. 
1981), there are few conclusions concerning the conditions that may cause one group 
norm to override others. See Siegel & Siegel, Reference Groups, Membership Groups, 
and Attitude Change, 55 J. ABNORMAL & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 360 (1957). 
165. Anchorage Community Hospital, Inc., 225 N.L.R.B. 575, 576-77 (1976) (Walther, 
dissenting). 
166. See Wall St. J., Feb. 25, 1982, at 4, col. 2 (Chrysler suffered net operating losses 
of $475.6 million in 1981); N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1981, at 1, col. 2 (net operating loss of 
$1.71 billion in 1980); N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1980, at 1, col. 1 (net operating loss of $1.1 
billion in 1979); N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1979, § 4, at 1, col 3 (net loss of $204.6 million in 
1978). 
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employee can claim, either before the Board or the courts, that 
the union is failing fairly to represent the members. Or, employ-
ees able to gamer the necessary support can petition the NLRB 
for an election to decertify the union as the bargaining represen-
tative. In many cases, however, these options are more illusory 
than real. 
The power of union officials to exercise wide discretion in con-
tract negotiations was emphasized in Ford Motor Co. v. 
Huffman, 167 where the Supreme Court observed that effective 
.collective bargaining necessitated a broad delegation of auth-
ority to negotiators to make concessions and accept proposals if 
in their view the interests of the parties would thereby best be 
served. As a result, courts have accorded a "wide range of rea-
sonableness" to unions negotiating agreements with 
employees.168 
The NLRB position likewise is broadly accepting of union ac-
tions under duty-of-fair-representation standards; the Board en-
visions a circumscribed set of situations in which it will enter-
tain charges of inadequate union representation. According to 
the NLRB General Counsel, "if there is no independent evi-
dence of bad motive, complaint will not issue where the union 
gives some reasonable, judgemental [sic] explanation for its deci-
sion. If the union action passes these tests, . . . [the] proper re-
course is the ballot box, not before the General Counsel or the 
Board."169 
Under these formulae, absent evidence of overt wrongdoing, 
should a union begin to place greater emphasis upon manage-
ment's objectives as a result of its involvement in governing the 
enterprise, it will undoubtedly have a "reasonable, judgmental" 
rationale for a less aggressive bargaining posture. Certainly, a 
167. 345 U.S. 330 (1953). The Ford Motor Company and the UAW had agreed to give 
seniority credit for World War II veterans who had not worked for the company before 
the war. This agreement was challenged by several employees, who claimed that the 
UAW had breached its duty of fair representation by making a distinction on the basis 
of a factor not related to wages and working conditions. 
168. Inevitably differences arise in the manner and degree to which the terms of 
any negotiated agreement affect individual employees and classes of employees. 
The mere existence of such differences does not make them invalid. The com-
plete satisfaction of all who are represented is hardly to be expected. A wide 
range of reasonableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining representative in 
serving the unit it represents, subject always to complete good faith and honesty 
of purpose in the exercise of its discretion. 
Id. at 337-38. 
169. Address by NLRB General Counsel John S. Irvin, ABA Nat. Inst. on "The Na-
tional Labor Relations Act - Current Review" 10 (Apr. 27, 1979) (on file with the Jour-
nal of Law Reform). 
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bargaining position arguably based upon the long-term health of 
the enterprise would fall within the "wide range of reasonable-
ness" entrusted to unions engaged in negotiations. As a result, 
disgruntled union members would find little hope under a duty-
of-fair-representation theory for a successful challenge to a 
"softer" position adopted by their bargaining representative. 
Simultaneously, the General Counsel'.s invitation for dissatis-
fied employees to use the ballot box may be a hollow one, par-
ticulary where, as here, the employer's facilities are geographi-
cally dispersed ~d employees are covered by national 
agreements. By way of illustration, the UAW represents in ex-
cess of one-hundred units of Chrysler employees, of which forty-
nine are production and maintenance units. The. employees in 
these units are located throughout the United States as well as 
Canada and Mexico, and are covered by uniform contracts nego-
tiated on a national level. The UAW, like many other interna-
tional unions, frequently petitions for individual units in the 
name of the International and the Local. If the local union suc-
ceeds in an election, the unit then is merged into the nationwide 
unit covering the relevant classifications of employees. These in-
dividual units cannot thereafter avoid application of a contract 
approved by the nationwide constituency. Further, once the lo-
cal union is certified or contractually recognized as part of a na-
tional unit, it cannot be decertified on an individual basis170 
even if initially it would have been an appropriate bargaining 
unit on its own;171 the merger effectively destroys the separate 
identity of the individual unit.172 Therefore, no single plant 
could avoid being bound by a UAW contract, considering the 
existence of a nationwide unit, a history of centralized bargain-
ing, and coverage under a single contract, even if that plant 
voted as a unit against the contract.178 Moreover, gathering the 
thirty percent showing-of-interest174 necessary to bring about an 
election would itself be a Herculean task beyond the reach even 
of most large organizations. Such structural barriers thus require 
170. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(A)(l)(ii) (1976); Fast Food Merchandisers, Inc., 242 
N.L.R.B. 8 (1979); General Elec. Co., 180 N.L.R.B. 1094 (1970). 
171. See Fast Food Merchandisers, Inc., 242 N.L.R.B. 8 (1979); W.A. Foote Memorial 
Hospital, Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. 540 (1977). 
172. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 29 (1979). 
173. Cf. Univac Div. of Remington Rand Div. of Sperry Rand Corp., 137 N.L.R.B. 
1232 (1962) (employee sought decertification of one plant out of a multiplant bargaining 
unit, but was denied because the Board said that the individual certified units had been 
merged into one overall unit and so could not later be decertified on an individual basis). 
174. NLRB Statements of Procedure, Series 8, 29 C.F.R. § 101.18(a) (1981); cf. id. §§ 
101.26, .27(a)(3) (initiation of rescission-of-authority cases also apply 30% rule). 
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that tremendous organization and economic resources be mar-
shalled to mount a campaign capable of decertifying a nation-
wide unit, and serve to make the ballot box a false hope in many 
instances. 17~ 
CONCLUSION 
Douglas Fraser's election to a position on the governing board 
of the Chrysler Corporation constitutes a singular event in the 
history of relations between organized labor and management in 
this country. The union's assumption of a broader capacity in 
the enterprise represents a marked departure from the limited, 
adversarial role adopted nearly universally by unions in their 
dealings with management over the past century. In this under-
taking, union and management have embarked upon an experi-
ment with nonadversarial relations at the policy-making level of 
corporate governance. 
The NLRA, for nearly a half-century the cornerstone of na-
tional labor policy, has institutionalized the limited pattern of 
American labor-management relations. Despite the NLRA's ad-
herence to this conventional model, however, decisions by the 
courts and the NLRB indicate clearly that Fraser's participation 
in corporate governance does not run afoul of the Act. The pre-
mise that union officials serving as corporate directors will re-
main loyal to employee interests dictates that, without more, 
Fraser's new duties will not be considered inherently injurious to 
employee interests. 
By their agreement, the UAW and Chrysler are venturing into 
uncharted waters of employment relations. In so doing, they 
have set aside antagonistic positions and recognized their mu-
tual interdependence, in developments that seem wholly salubri-
ous. At the same time, Fraser appears fully capable of address-
ing the problems confronting the corporation while continuing to 
advance the best interests of auto industry employees. 
In other instances, though, the liberal acceptance of unions in 
175. These difficulties, however, may be largely hypothetical when applied specifi-
cally to the issues of Fraser's election to the Chrysler board, due to the general satisfac-
tion with the arrangement among UAW members. Accounts from union members and 
negotiators as well as from fellow directors and management officials indicate that Fraser 
has continued to represent his constituents vigorously and responsibly. See Wall St. J., 
Mar. 12, 1981, at 33, col. 4. Moreover, the UAW has a long record and tradition of integ-
rity and fidelity to the desires of the membership. See James, Union Democracy and the 
L.M.R.D.A., 13 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 247, 353 (1978). 
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corporate governance may present grave dangers; many unions 
may be less responsive than the UAW to the needs of their 
memberships. As one prominent union president has cautioned, 
an inherent risk increasing the scope of union functions "is that 
the union will eventually end up negotiating with itself. A corol-
lary risk is that ... [a]s worker representatives on directing 
boards become more and more involved in management's 
problems, they are likely to become less and less responsive to 
the needs of those they represent."178 Where the Board's pre-
sumption of continuing union loyalty proves misguided, disaf-
fected employees may have little opportunity to remedy the 
union's subsequent inadequate representation of their interests. 
If employees cannot fully redress their grievances either through 
the legal system or through collective bargaining, they might 
well turn to other, less peaceful means. It would be tragically 
ironic if accommodation of nonadversarial employment rela-
tions, as embodied in the Chrysler-UAW agreement, engendered 
frustration and strife of the sort the NLRA was designed to 
abate. 
176. Address by William Winpisinger, supra note 26, at 6. 

